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Abstract
This thesis explores the changing cultural meanings that the Volkswagen took in
Germany in an attempt to understand the cultural exchange between the United States and
Germany. In sum, it establishes that the car takes a distinct cultural form in the two countries
governed by unique and particular historical developments. Over the last decade researchers
working with car cultures have realized the long standing error of taking American values
associated with the car as a normative marker of global car cultures, yet no one has suggested a
working methodology to ensure that non-normative meanings are captured in analysis. I suggest
that this problem arises from studying single aspects of the car in isolation. The methodology
that I propose looks at design, production, marketing, and consumption as a system where
meaning can be produced, interpreted, and reassigned at the various stages. This wider approach
allows for a non-normative analysis of car culture. This helps to demonstrate how the
development of the car culture becomes more distinct through transatlantic interaction. I propose
that the incursion of culturally significant foreign products causes shifts and redefinitions in the
domestic market making the product a way to evaluate one’s own identity.
The present work plots these various identities to capture the large trajectories of German
car culture. I challenge the notion that there were necessarily different cultures of production
and consumption in the United States and Germany which could explain the divergence in the
two nation’s car’s cultures. When discussing the Weimar Republic I highlight Germany’s
interest in motorization visa-vie developments in the United States. The section on the Third
Reich places the creation of a Volkswagen as a lynchpin for the Nazi’s entire ultranationalistic
modernization policy which carried meanings of their particular vision of racial community. The
post-war section identifies the ways that the Federal Republic reinterpreted the Volkswagen

making it a symbol of the economic miracle of the 1950s, and ultimately, a way to contrast the
republic with the Nazis era and win international validation.
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I. Introduction and Methods and Guiding Questions: The Volkswagen Beetle and Cultural
Duality
When considering the history of the automobile in America, very few cars have endured
and imprinted themselves so firmly into the cultural tapestry that subsequent generations can
identify them on the road at a glance. If the category is refined to imports, the Volkswagen
Beetle stands alone. The reception of the small German car in America was surprisingly warm
despite the contrasts that it represented with the large monuments in metal that poured out from
Detroit. The VW was largely praised, often tongue-in-cheek, for its build quality and the driving
sensation that it produced.1 Much in the way that modernist artists attempt to reduce a landscape
to its base elements, the VW was, in its combination of form and function, high art brought down
to the man on the street: Bauhaus for the blue collar, a Neoclassical antidote to the Roccoco
chaos of big tailfins and afterburner taillights.2 With its distinctive shape the Beetle stood out in
America’s automotive landscape, but in 1960 one in three cars on the road in Germany were a
Volkswagen, making it the defining element in Germany’s automotive landscape. Thus, in
Germany, the Volkswagen Mk 1 Sedan, only later and begrudgingly dubbed ‘the Beetle,’ was
just “the car,” an aspect that Volkswagen later chose to highlight when the company adopted the
corporate motto, “Das Auto.”3 With such diversity in context, when the first Beetle rolled into
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Floyd Clymer, “Report on Foreign Cars,” Popular Mechanics Vol. 97 No.3 March 1952, 106110, 288.
2
“Machine gun Rococo” was taken from a description of Tom Wolfe’s story concerning
California youth in the early 60s as described in Daniel Horowitz, Consuming Pleasures:
Intellectuals and Popular Culture in the Postwar World, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012,
283. Tom Wolfe, The Kandy-Kolored Tangerine-Flake Streamline Baby, (New York: New York
Herald Tribune 1963).
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“VW’s New Tag Line: ‘Das Auto’” Motor Authority Magazine Oct. 2007.
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the Hoffman Motor Car showroom in New York City in 1950, Americans and Germans
encountered principally different things.4
Recent works on the Beetle highlight how the Beetle was imprinted with a multiplicity of
meanings because German national reference points were drowned out by the foreign contexts,
that is, the Beetle was viewed as a cultural tabula rasa.5 In outlining his predominately
American account, Phil Patton says it most succinctly: “the Bug suggests that designs, images,
and ideas do not remain identified with the cultures that create them.”6 Through statements like
these historians have denied that there is anything inherently German about the small car, or that
if there is, that the presence of the Germaness goes unfelt. These conclusions fit with other
studies which look at how cultural adaptation of consumer goods better describes how
multinational consumer goods appear and function in foreign cultures.7 To the degree that the
Beetle was permitted to thrive in other cultural contexts, most notably in the United States and
Mexico, this judgment carries some weight; Americans bought German cars for American
reasons. This realization, combined with the success of the Beetle, has help historians
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Paul Ingrassia, Engines of Change: The History of the American Dream in Fifteen Cars, (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 2012) 94; Bernhard Rieger, The People’s Car: A Global History of
the Volkswagen Beetle, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013) 232.
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Phill Patton, Bug; The Strange Mutations of the World’s Most Famous Automobile (New York:
Da Capo Press 2002). Andrea Hiott, Thinking Small: The Long Strange Trip of the Volkswagen
Beetle (New York, Ballantine Books, 2012); Rieger, The People’s Car.
6
Patton, Bug, 6; Patton’s emphasis on the Mexican experiences with the Beetle govern this
conclusion, since, even more than in Germany, it is fair to say that the Beetle was foundational
to the development of Mexican car culture.
7
This is the position that helps undermine the concept of Americanization developed by Rob
Kroes. Rob Kroes, American Mass Culture and European Youth Culture,” in Axel Schildt and
Detlef Siegfried eds. Between Marx and Coca-Cola: Youth Cultures in Changing European
Societies, 1960-1980 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006) 82-108.
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problematized earlier explanations concerning the processes of cultural transformations, such as
Americanization.8
Indeed the concept of Americanization has not fared well in recent years. While partial
to its descriptive functions Konrad Jarausch criticizes the term for being imprecise and overtly
political. 9 To help with the imprecision of the term Kasper Masse divided the concept into five
forms of Americanization; however, these categories hardly address all of the economic,
political, and cultural dimensions for which the concept is routinely employed.10 Rob Kroes
believes that analysis based on Americanization inevitably “reduces the complex processes of
cultural influence, of borrowing, imitation, and reception, to a stark binary form of a zero-sum
game.” Moving from a theoretical construct to a constructivist account, Christoph Hendrik
Müller notes that in the post-war Americanization was simply the way to complain about
modernization in general.11
Yet, as the concept of Americanization fails to capture the cultural transformation of
Germany in the 1950s historians have struggled to present an alternative concept that can fill the
explanatory void. The concept of Westernization, proposed by Anselm Döring-Manteuffel,
suffers from the same normative functions as Americanization but is writ large through the
analytic paradigm of the “Ideas of 1789,” effectively importing all of the normative issues
associated with the Sonderweg Thesis.12 Moreover, as Konrad Jarausch notes, Westernization’s
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Uta G. Poiger. Jazz, Rock and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided
Germany, (Berkeley, University of California, 2000) 3-6.
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Konrad Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006) 104.
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Christoph Hendrik Müller, West Germans Against the West: Anti-Americanism in Media and
Public Opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-68, (New York: Palgrave Macmillian
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Ibid., 7.
3

“content continues to refer primarily to American influences.”13 The same problems occur in the
literature that reverses the paradigm to find narratives of Europeanization.14 Alternatively, as
much as one can distill a process of Globalization it only seems to point to the increasing
interconnectivity of the world without offering much explanation on the causality of cultural
transformation at such nexuses. The issues with the analytic properties of Americanization and
the subsequent variants go beyond the term’s imprecision, its reductive nature, or its overly
simplistic assertions. However historians configure the terms, Americanization, Westernization,
Europeanization all share the same conceptual features based on concepts of hegemonic
pressure, normative trajectories, and attempts to foreground external cultural patterns in
necessarily foreign cultural contexts.
Thus, the rejection of Americanization seems well warranted and would also seem to
suggest a dismissal of the competing sibling theories of Westernization and Europeanization.
But analytics that problematized these concepts sow the seeds for wider destruction. The
inherent danger in all of these attacks is a way to talk about cultural change more generally.
Kroes’ concern about the reductive nature of Americanization simply acknowledges the gulf that
always exists between generalized phenomenon that theories attempt to explain and the specific
examples that historical inquiry aims to reveal. Losing the distinction between Americanization
and Westernization is meant to centralize political culture, yet it also undermines geographic
boundaries, not only by moving from the specific to the general, i.e. America to “the West,” but
also by using the ideology of the French Revolution that would be experienced differently within
national cultural contexts. Although Europeanization lack a clear conceptual framework, it too
homogenizes all of Europe into a single mass which only seems appropriate when discussing the
13
14

Jarausch, After Hitler, 104.
Ibid., 70.
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political integration of the continent into the European Union. The goal of such strategies seems
to be to further distance the theory from the category of study in order to blur the distinctive
elements in an effort to make the theory fit the evidence. Thus, Americanization is much like a
mirage, depending on the distance of the analysis Americanization may appear real but on closer
inspection of specifics and details, the evidence sublimates.
The present work attempts to place the Volkswagen into the conversation concerning
cultural transformation caused by the transatlantic exchange of products. The small car is
instructive to this conversation because of the diverse meanings that the car took in the two
national settings which provide enough contrast to show transformations centered on the single
product. Yet without the sufficient contextualization the Volkswagen story may be
misinterpreted as an Americanization narrative. Yet when taken in the longue durée the two
distinct car cultures demonstrate a two way traffic that informs rather than blurs distinctions.
This cultural engagement began with Germany’s fascination with American life, methods of
production and the Model T, soon afterwards American automotive firms put subsidiaries in
Germany. The automobile’s cultural meaning became ever more important in the Third Reich as
the promise of a people’s car forged a crucial linchpin for the Nazis’ entire modernization policy.
In the post-war period German car culture had to negotiate the meanings that Hitler had ascribed
to the automobile while also avoiding losing the particular German-ness of their heritage. In the
process of these trajectories two powerful scripts were written and reinforced, where the United
States became predominately a car culture centered on consumption and Germany became a
nation of car producers. Production and consumption were integrated in ways that reinforce this
dichotomy. The United States automotive production favored Sloanism which implemented
strategies of planned obsolescence and the creation of cultural need from the product itself,
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making consumption a central part of production.15 Conversely marketing and consumption in
Germany was often based on what took place in the factory.16
A. An Academic Road Trip: Exploring the Nation through the Car
The study of car cultures has made few assertions concerning cultural transformation in
the face of international exchange largely because of the limited way that cars enter academic
conversations. Many authors never take the car out of the factory, instead looking only to what
Patton calls the “metal life” of the car.17 Yet, the metal life of the car gives rise to the “mental
life” of the car, where its specific materiality transcends its function and its aesthetics. Mimi
Sheller notes, “the car materializes personality and takes part in the ego-formation of the owner
or driver as competent, powerful, able and sexually desirable (Sheller’s particular interest).” 18
Importantly, she suggests that “the individual psychological investment in the car can be said to
arise out of the sensibility of an entire car culture.”19 The Beetle, therefore, fits within the
suggestion of Bauhaus and Neoclassical not simply because of how it deals with the principles of
design; rather because it is able to communicate complex messages that its users were able to
intuit within the user’s own cultural context.
Along these lines, historians have begun to access the “mental life” of the automobile,
albeit from serialized narrow vantage points which, in synthesis, become a presentation of chalk
dust and not what was written with the chalk. What is needed is a more extensive approach to
the automobile; one that understands car culture as a system that moves and is moved by the
15

Flink, The Automobile Age, (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1992) 244.
Volkswagen Advertisement, “Wenn Sie den VW nicht sehen.” Der Spiegel no 1. January 8,
1964, 71.
17
I am borrowing from Patton the distinction of the “metal life” and “mental life,” “The Bug’s
mental life far exceeds its metal one.” Patton, Bug, 2.
18
Mimi Sheller, “Automotive Emotions: Feeling the Car,” Theory, Culture and Society 21 no. 45 (2004) pp. 221-242, 225.
19
Ibid.
16
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outside world. Products that become cultural artifacts are created and recreated through several
distinguishable phases: design, production, marketing, and consumption, and at each phase
designers, marketers, and consumers create, interpret and adjust meaning in an attempt to
connect with the public.
Through the differences in aesthetics, everyday experiences and materiality, Tim O’Dell,
Rudy Koshar, Tim Edensor, and Mimi Sheller suggest that car cultures are national phenomenon
where meaning helps to constitute geographical boundaries.20 Yet no one has considered how
these nationally contained car cultures may be the product of production since the operating
policy of most car manufacturers in the first half of the twentieth century was one that created
cars for specific national markets. The Volkswagen was one of the first cars to successfully
question this practice making a single model for the entire world. Nevertheless, the transatlantic
Volkswagen story pivots on changing definitions of national meaning; specifically, of what it
means to be German and what it means to be American. The Volkswagen Beetle was conceived
in a moment of German existential crisis during the Weimar Republic, where American ways of
life aroused fear and fascination.21 Commissioned by Hitler in a tragicomic misreading of
American culture, the car was designed to be uniquely German, where uniquely German simply
meant not American.22 The Nazis envisioned building the small car with the American
manufacturing system in a factory set on a clearing near Fallersleben that was modeled on Ford’s
20

Ibid., 233.
K. B. Hopfinger, The Volkswagen Story, (Cambridge MA: Robert Bentley Inc. 1971) 36-8.
Karl Ludvigsen, Battle for the Beetle: The Untold Story of the Post-War Battle for Adolf Hitler’s
giant Volkswagen Factory and the Porsche—designed Car that became an Icon for Generations
around the Globe, (Cambridge MA: Bentley 2000.) 2-6. Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity,
American Business and the Modernization of Germany, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1994) 3-6, 36-49. James J. Flink, The Automobile Age, (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press 1992)
113.
22
Ludvigsen, Battle for the Beetle, 15. Hopfinger, The Volkswagen Story, 74. Hoitt, Thinking
Small, 59. Flink, The Automobile Age, 262.
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River Rouge plant; yet, it was intended to become the heart of a new utopian city of work that
would dwarf Detroit.23
After the war, the plant fell under the management of Dr. Heinrich Nordhoff, a German
businessman who not only spent time in the United States learning American business practices
but also worked as a manager for Opel in the late 1920s, which was General Motors’ German
subsidiary.24 In the first years of production Germans were encouraged to buy the Volkswagen
based on its strong sales in America which they took as a crucial endorsement. In 1959 the
American advertising agency Doyle, Dane, and Bernbach (DDB) accepted the task of marketing
the car in the United States and Germany.25 DDB sold the little car to Americans as an example
of German quality and craftsmanship which later morphed into the marketing notion of German
engineering.26 When the Beetle was sent to the United States, it arrived with modest hopes.
Despite this, North America soon became the company’s most important market.27 Even though
the United States received this honor many commentators then and now identify the Beetle as a
“symbol of the new Germany.”28 Despite this intricate international exchange, the Volkswagen
never lost its German identity either in the United States or in Germany. The Beetle is able to
reveal so much about both the United States and Germany largely due to the historical
happenstance of its development.
In addition to the natural experiment of having the same car on both sides to the Atlantic,
the Beetle also straddles other important boundaries. Manufacturing and selling a car in the
1950s that was designed in the 1930s and leaving that design largely unaltered until end of
23

Hoitt, Thinking Small, 127-41; Ludvigsen, Battle for the Beetle, 31, 35-38.
Rieger, The People’s Car, 108.
25
Hiott, Thinking Small, 359.
26
Ibid., 366.
27
Rieger, The People’s Car, 198-201.
28
Ibid., 125.
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production in 1978 makes the Beetle a temporal experiment in continuity. This unique stability
in design marks the Beetle with the vestiges of an industrial model of production and
consumption which, in the post-war trans-Atlantic world community, the Beetle was thrust into a
largely post-industrial world. The success of an industrial model of production that sharply
contrasts the business practices of Detroit (Sloanism) complicates many explanations for the
Beetle’s success since it sold well in demographics that could afford bigger cars, more powerful
cars, more luxurious cars and/or cars with higher technological elements.29
All commuter vehicles span the space between the public and private spheres by
containing elements of both: the public exterior and the private interior, the public road and the
private garage or driveway. Some authors have commented on how the car crosses the worlds of
work and leisure as well.30 The Beetle also spans categories of class and gender. In the United
States and Germany, the car atrracted working class and lower income middle class families, but,
particularly in the United States, its affordability made it desirable for upper middle class
families seeking to become multiple car households, and in the United Sates, the simple and
underpowered Beetle was marketed to be the perfect ‘wife’s car.’31 In Germany, the Beetle
remained more of a masculine component in a consumer culture that veered towards the
feminine.32 Many have noted that product design, automotive or otherwise, mediates between
culture and technology. This is a problematic definition as cultures and technologies do not
divide so easily. 33 The Beetle’s popularity in the United States seems to draw out this point,

29

Rieger, The People’s Car, 204-6
Jürgen Habermas, “Auto Fahren: Der Mensch am Linksrad.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
November 27, 1954.
31
Rieger, The People’s Car, 201.
32
Ibid., 168.
33
Jeffery L. Meikle, “Ghosts in the Machine: Why it is Hard to Write about Design,”
Technology and Culture, 46 no. 2 2005 385-92.
30
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since its technological features (which are not as insignificant as is often presumed) are nearly
universally overshadowed by its “cute” emotional appeal.34
B. Design and Production
While the automobile is one of the more durable cultural and technological forms, the
Beetle’s cultural duality (or, more aptly, multiplicity) reveals how the automobile represents a
culturally contested space, and how the automobile sits within a wider cultural context. Car
culture is a composite image of the role of automobility in a society which draws on the political,
economic, social, cultural, and intellectual functions of the automobile within a designated
community. It is the ways in which automobiles are designed, manufactured, discussed, bought,
sold, and experienced. This impression is furthered by Bernhard Rieger when he expounds that,
“automobiles can be seen as physical manifestations of abstract notions ranging from, among
others, ‘speed’ and ‘freedom’ to ‘unconventionality’ and ‘wealth.’”35
During almost half a century of relative and often self-imposed isolation, car culture in
Germany and the United States developed on separate trajectories. Until the Beetle disproved
the theory, car manufacturers operated on the assumption that American and European cars were
not directly exportable for mass consumption, and in course, the only market utilized for
exportation were those machines suitable for the high-end luxury consumer. Of course the
politics of two World Wars tended to limit the number of commuter vehicles exchanged across
the Atlantic. Beyond the wars, it is possible to sketch some of the material causes and effects of
this divergence in culture. After the war, direct exchange was hampered by protective tariffs in
Europe that targeted specific features of American automobiles. The favorite example of this
principle for automotive historians was the “horsepower tax” which Germany introduced in
34
35

Hiott, Thinking Small, 6.
Rieger, The People’s Car, 6.
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1906, with many major car producing nations following Germany’s example.36 The
“horsepower tax” was not actually a tax on the power that the engine made, rather on the
displacement size of the engine. This pushed engine development in Europe towards the goal of
making more horsepower with a smaller displacement, giving European motors the general
characteristics of lower torque and higher revving engines when compared to their American
counterparts. The smaller engines encouraged lighter construction so the deficit in torque would
be less noticeable. In turn, the lighter cars were made nimble through chassis and suspension
developments. Some authors have pointed to geographic reasons that aid this development,
commenting on how early European roads were rougher and windier and how the automobile
was shoehorned into the already cramped infrastructure of European cities.37 The basic
economic gulf between depression in continental Europe and boom in the United States during
the formative years of the 1920s also cannot be ignored as an important factor in the asymmetry
between the two systems. These developments, coupled with conscious efforts to cultivate
national dimensions of automobility helped to create a unique automotive experience in
Germany which informed distinct restructuring of values systems and associations centered on
the automobile.
The Beetle’s success in these two markets creates a unique, almost ideal, opportunity for
the cultural historian because it pulls into relief the different values and principles that created
and consumed the single product. The Beetle’s life after it was first unloaded in New York is
also an example of how trajectories can shift in the face of cultural exchange. The Beetle was
the first import car that caused considerable consternation in Detroit. By the early 1960s, both of
the major automobile companies (Ford and General Motors) released domestic cars that
36
37

Flink, The Automobile Age, 76-82.
Ibid., 293.
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attempted to incorporate the German idea.38 In a time when Americans bought American cars,
the Beetle made the import an acceptable alternative to domestic offerings; in a way, lowering
the defenses for the Japanese invasion of the 70s and 80s.39 Likewise, international success
shaped the future of Volkswagen as the company began to imagine a post-Beetle world. They
wrestled with the balance between the German identity they cultivated and the needs of outside
cultures.40 Much of this contest of identity was resolved by acquiring other car manufacturers
but retaining the iconic names, like German Audi, British Bentley, French Bugatti, Spanish
SEAT, Czech Škoda, and Italian Lamborghini. While cultivating this international presence,
Volkswagen ultimately decided to rediscover and reinvent the car that brought them into contact
with the wider world by releasing a modern Beetle in 1998. Yet, the new Beetle is more of a
reference rather than a revolution, as its updated non-utilitarian sensibility fits with the global
trends of automotive design in the United States, Germany, and Japan.41 The new Beetle accepts
rather than rejects the late twentieth century’s compromises of parsimony for the pursuit of
luxuries in an automotive landscape that they helped to create after the Beetle. Yet, by 2000 the
question of which car culture is displacing the others is by no means clear. In recent decades,
Volkswagen has become the world’s largest automotive manufacturer, while Detroit has
atrophied in the global market.
When Heinrich Nordhoff took his seat as General Manager of the Volkswagen plant in
1948, his estimation was that “exporting cars to America is like carrying beer to Bavaria.”42
While much has changed since Nordhoff made these remarks 67 years ago, his statement marks
38
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an important continuity as to the meanings of production. Americans still accept the positive
stereotype that German and Japanese cultures strive for perfectibility in their creations.
Conversely, American production culture is co-opted by the image of the soulless corporation
which, in the name of profits, attempts to meet the minimum standard of quality and
innovation.43 Whereas Volkswagen continues to sell cars based on their Germaness, Chrysler,
after being purchased by Italian auto manufacture Fiat, has taken a fresh tack with its new
tagline: “This is Chrysler: America’s Import.”44

Certainly Chrysler’s advertisement is trying to

have the best of both worlds by revitalizing the “made in America” sentiment, making an appeal
to national pride while still promising the quality of an import. Implicit in this advertisement’s
statement is that where the car is built imparts a mystical sense of the nation that built it. In the
age of the global corporation these stereotypes somehow ignore the fact that many German and
Japanese factories reside in North America and that designers for automobiles are drawn from an
international pool. Yet, the myth helps to create the reality, and mythologies surrounding
national forms of production hold as much sway today as they did in 1950. 45
Moving the creation of these national myths to the center of the story rests on the
assumption that the things that cultures create are emblematic, or otherwise carry some
information about the culture that created and consumed these goods. The historical debates
which featured production methods and values of consumption attempt to transcend the
meaningless tautology that German cars are German because they are made in Germany by
showing the subjective nation as a site of contention. The pertinent question for Volkswagen in
43

Flink, Automobile Age, 291.
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the twentieth century is: can national forms of production and consumption exist or is “German
Engineering” just American marketing?46
This study is not evaluating these two nations as political and geographical units; rather it
seeks to recreate and evaluate the subjective content of these two nations. The external image of
America, not as an actual place but a label for certain ideals, persuaded and directed Germany’s
car culture, sometimes as a model and at other times a negative example. Thus, it is possible to
see how myth created reality as these national constructs created performative identities as a selfjustifying act. Part of the Volkswagen’s mission was tied to negotiating a mental and cultural
space that could reconcile American forms of production and consumption to German needs.
Sometimes the creation of a German form of production and consumption was the ultimate end.
In other instances the impulse to negotiate these American ideas was a project of avoiding the
pitfalls that American consumer society faced. Acting on such ideals often resulted in
unresolved contradictions especially in the Third Reich as pastoral and traditional ideals of
Germany came into conflict with the modern and industrializing notions of America.
C. Marketing and Consumption
Turning from design and production, the next stop in the extended process of examining
car culture moves toward the consumer through marketing and consumption. If car buying was
simply a task of finding the best mode of transportation, everyone would drive the same
affordable, reliable, safe car. Yet, the individual’s aspirations and self-assessments become a
feature in the decision-making process. As such, it is possible for advertising to make affective
appeals to consumers by placing the automobile at the center of a happy family, or promising an
alternate world of freedom and power to contrast the world of the corporate cog. The extent that
46
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this form of advertising is manipulative, and therefore, unethical has given philosophers and
social scientists a basis for creating an entire corpus of literature. This questioning of the
efficacy and morality of advertising hit its apogee in the 1980s and 1990s, yet the interested
parties’ inability to forge a meaningful consensus indicates that theories concerning advertising’s
role still inform powerful and important debates today. Indeed, the gulf between the two
positions is based on two incompatible and insurmountable assumptions based on the value of
human activity, with the pessimist view seeing advertising as replacing the good life with a life
of goods. In response, these writers make calls for higher forms of consciousness through high
culture while the optimist view casts doubts on the assumption that any form of human activity is
inherently better than another.47 Through such broad approaches, advertising becomes another
arena to contest and evaluate the trajectory of modern life.
Two general statements help situate the role of advertising in consumer cultures. First,
effective advertisements can produce powerful scripts concerning social norms. Secondly, it is
not clear where the actual authorship for the cultural content of these scripts takes place. For
present purposes, it is possible to strike middle ground through an approach that deals with this
manipulation in a value neutral way. By first asking the question, ‘what does advertising do?’
one can turn to the question of whether the effects are malevolent or benevolent. Creating a
critical approach that achieves these objectives centers on the authorship of advertisements.
Acknowledging that the themes for such scripts come from the larger culture helps to ground the
advertisement’s moral direction in a wider system of cultural production.
By placing advertising and marketing as a step in a circular process of consumer culture
it becomes clear that, like the car designer, much of the authorship takes place outside of the
47
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drafting table or the Madison Avenue board room. This is one of the core sentiments of Michael
Schudson’s Advertising, the Uneasy Persuasion: its Dubious Impact on American Society,
indicating that the initial impulses that advertising and the media seize upon first arise in the
public.48 What this means is that there are limits to manipulation because advertisements must
draw on cultural values rather than create them whole cloth. In this vein of thought, advertising
becomes more about amplification than authorship.
Going beyond consumer psychology--- where the sale is the end and all other aspects are
the means--- this study suggests that consumer cultures evolve in an imperfect cycle of
production and consumption. Through this process some products become cultural artifacts.
The extent that the product is created by the culture and the culture is created by the product
becomes murky at best, and by some accounts indistinguishable.49 The individual’s agency, not
only to select products but also to interpret their meaning and use them to form relationships with
others, recasts certain products as politically, socially, economically, and/or ideologically
significant.
The automobile is a composite of the ambitions and anxieties of modern life and, to this
end, the automobile is highly instructive to understanding these cultural value systems. Partly
function, partly fashion, the automobile is a text that can be read in regards to design when
placed with other sources like popular magazines and publications. For such grounding I look to
over 200 issues of Berliner Illustrirte Zeitung from 1924-1926 and again in 1934-1935. The
other sizable body of work for this study comes from the weekly magazine, Der Speigel, and my
analysis includes the years between 1948 and 1956 including the DDB advertising campaigns
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from 1959-1966. This systematic research is supplemented with comparative incidental articles
from Time Magazine, Popular Mechanics and Sports Illustrated from the same years. The
format of the magazine lends itself well to cultural studies as part of the white noise of everyday
life and more often than not is intended to entertain and inform the mainstream rather than
editorialize polemically.
This thesis attempts to evaluate and utilize three important components in order to
establish my major argument concerning the cultural duality of the Volkswagen in Germany and
the United States. The first element reviews the current literature and specific historiographies on
which this study is based in an attempt to lay bare the current gaps in the histories concerning the
Volkswagen. The second element outlines the development of German car culture’s trajectories
to establish my central analysis that in 1950 the Beetle was two different cars in the two different
contexts of the United States and Germany. This will provide a much needed point of reference
for later discussions and give an opportunity to make minor but important amendments to the
Volkswagen story and suggest future questions that will help connect the study of Volkswagen
with the larger currents in histories of Germany. The third element will utilize primary research
on cultural representations of the Beetle and consider the nature of cultural transformation
through the automobile. By combining these three elements it is possible to demonstrate parts
of the “mental world” of the automobile in the changing contexts of the United States and
Germany. This thesis concludes by tying these themes to an exploration of some of the current
issues that German and American car cultures face.
Finally, there is a danger that cultural studies of Volkswagen will be reduced to a
neighboring question: “Why was the Volkswagen successful?” The combination of this
reductionist view with a topic this recent will lead some to suggest that cultural methods are a
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long way around to a quick conclusion, insisting the real answers lay in interviewing Beetle
owners or seeking out period customer satisfaction records. Yet rather that attempt to aggregate
reception of the Volkswagen to create a cohesive image it is much more beneficial to understand
the larger conversations and the mental world that was created around the car. I insist that
customers are present in this process and their satisfaction or dissatisfaction is captured in the
transformation of the production and consumption processes.
D. Analytical Historiography
Car culture is rarely defined in any formal way. As noted above, the car is an
academically contested object that lacks unifying technological or philosophical aspects that
would lend itself to a definition. Yet, for the present work, the squabbling over the demarcation
of the boundaries among cars, motorcycles, buses, commuter vehicles, commercial vehicles etc,
can be put to one side in order to accept a commonsensical definition that the car is a vehicle for
personal conveyance. Historians evaluating car cultures seek to gain understanding concerning
the values of groups of people who engage with the idea of the car. It is therefore an area of
study devoted to chronicling and analyzing the interactions between people, their cars and other
people through the car. Studying car culture in this way has recently emerged from a longer
tradition of automotive histories, with the major contrast being that automotive histories’ general
focus was on the more concrete aspects of the automobile, its “life in metal,” as Patton puts it,
corporate biographies, and chronicles of specific designers and models.50 Since the Beetle is one
of the world’s most popular cars experience on the global stage, it is unsurprising that it has
attracted the attention of many automotive historians. Many of these historians were able to raise
questions that went beyond the “metal life” of the automobile and point to the “mental life” of
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the car, yet their methodologies could not produce sufficient answers to these questions. The
first major work of car culture was possibly Wolfgang Sachs’ Die Liebe zum Automobil: ein
Rücksblick in die Geschichte unserer Wünsche, which was first published in 1984, and is still
considered one of the best works on car culture. As an environmentalist, Sachs was interested in
why we continue to invest such energy into the automobile despite the plethora of externalities
like traffic and pollution. His answer was simply that the story of twentieth century Germany’s
relationship to the car was that of a romance; it offered independence, speed, comfort in equal
measure with “our desires.” Thus, the automobile became an organizing feature in German
society. Sach’s book contained a unique guiding question that went beyond the interests of
earlier histories.
Sach’s work was a rare breakaway from the traditional patterns of automotive history; as
a whole studies since Sachs fell back into the methodological ruts of the “metal life” of the car.
Daniel Miller remarked that, “the current literature has almost no grasp of the global reach of the
car today except in matters of production and destruction. There is no sense that the car might be
a different cultural form or experience among different groups.”51 At about the same time, Rudy
Koshar noted that scholarship on European car culture has, “paid even less attention to the
everyday uses and cultural representations of the automobile than American historiography
has.”52
The root of the problem that Koshar and Miller identify stems from a tendency to adopt
American car culture as normative and, in effect, search for American car culture abroad. One of
the many problems with this flawed methodology is that Germany, for instance, lacks many
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direct counterparts to American car culture; there is no German Graffiti, or comparable
equivalent to Tom Wolfe’s The Kandy-Kolored Tangerine-Flake Streamline Baby, or Beach
Boy’s “Little Deuce Coupe.”53 With few points of direct comparison and a normative model of
car culture, recent literature has been best positioned to grapple with the first aspect of Miller’s
complaint by exploring, “the global dimensions of the car.”54
Coming to terms with the second part of Miller’s criticism by discovering how the car
becomes “a different cultural form or experience among different groups,” has proved difficult in
Germany because of these limited points of direct comparison. Part of the problem is that Miller
focuses on consumption and materiality to the exclusion of other important aspects of
production, design and marketing. These points in the production and consumption process form
important contexts that help capture meaning in different cultural milieu. This suggests the need
to look at car culture through a more systematic and extensive approach that includes the entire
process of production and consumption. Production is particularly important in understanding
the automobile in Germany. Yet, that is not to say that some direct comparison cannot be made.
The Beetle provides such an ability for direct comparison. The car itself provides a window into
the two car cultures by demonstrating the common and contrasting responses to the single car.
The car’s broad success in the two markets for over two decades ensures that these points of
commonality and difference reflect equally broad trends experience in these two consumer
cultures. At the base of these trends is a challenging and rethinking of what it means to be
American and German through production and consumption.
Volkswagen and the Beetle seem to catch the attention of the academic world in moments
of punctuated growth. These tend to cluster around the years 1970, 2000, and 2010, where 1970s
53
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saw Volkswagen expand production beyond the Beetle, 2000 saw the return of the Beetle in
North America and Germany, and in 2010 Volkswagen become the largest manufacturer in the
world. Therefore, the literature on Volkswagen tends to reflect a sense of optimism and surprise
that parallel the national mood of Germany’s Wirtschaftswunder or economic miracle of the
1950s. The one notable exception to the euphoria of the Volkswagen story is Hans Mommsen’s
Das Volkswagenwerk und seine Arbeiter im Dritten Reich, (The Volkswagen Factory and its
Workers in the Third Reich.) This work was commissioned by Volkswagen to control the
release of the information of the company’s most nefarious chapter and its use of forced labor
between 1939 and 1945. Besides the tendency to remember Volkswagen in moments of growth,
it is also notable that the number of academic works conducted in English outnumbers works
conducted in German. This is possibly due to academic differences between the two countries or
to the very fundamental differences in values concerning the automobile.
It is fair to say that the literature concerning the Beetle has most consistently been
presented as a story of heroes and villains; the technological heroism of Ferdinand Porsche, the
capitalistic hero of Heinz Nordhoff, the socialist hero of the undifferentiated factory worker, and
yet the villain is consistently and understandably Hitler and the Nazis. Each of these stories
holds up different personalities as responsible for the creation, destruction, and rebirth of the
enduring car brand, and, perhaps counterintuitively, they are all correct. With such a regular
villain, the first twenty years of historical inquiry into the Beetle was largely a process of
distancing the Beetle from the Nazis. K.B. Hopfinger’s 1971 monograph, The Volkswagen Story
began to exculpate the car from the ideology by focusing on the design and development of the
Beetle. He casts Dr. Porsche as his main character and by highlighting Porsche’s reluctance the
Volkswagen story becomes larger than just the ravings of Hitler. Yet as a foundational work The
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Volkswagen Story is incredibly self contained; looking at the development of the car and factory
Hopfinger succeeds in creating a complete corporate biography of Volkswagen until 1970.
Hopfinger’s main contention is placing Porsche in a central role in the car’s creation to disrupt
the popular association between the Beetle and the Nazis. This pattern is then perpetuated in
much of the literature concerning Volkswagen. In Birth of the Beetle: The Development of the
Volkswagen by Porsche, Chris Barber openly states that his book’s raison d’être is to remind the
world that Porsche was responsible for the world’s most popular car.55 Yet as Porsche exits the
Volkswagen story Heinrich Nordhoff, the General Manager of the Volkswagen factory from
1946-68 becomes the new figure of admiration but he is not given the same importance as Hitler
or Porsche. Indeed, without Nordhoff’s direction, which often defied conventional wisdom, the
Beetle, and even the company, may never have been.
Focusing on Porsche and Hitler has the added result of limiting the narrative to
Volkswagen’s development in the Third Reich. At best, this limited scope directs the study of
the Beetle as an effect of Third Reich culture much to the impairment of the Beetle’s effects on
subsequent German culture. Additionally, there are important continuities concerning
motorization as central to constructing notions of modernity in Weimar Germany influences
primarily by Ford. Rarely addressed are these cultural elements which inform the development
of the Beetle, which occasionally make small appearances in the creation of the master narrative
of the technological development of the Beetle. Nevertheless, Volkswagen and the Third Reich
are inescapably linked.

When one wishes to discuss Volkswagen, one must engage

Volkswagen as a tool for understanding the Nazi past. However, this should by no means limit
its discussion to before 1945.
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One work on Volkswagen which looks beyond the Third Reich in a significant way is
Karl Ludvigsen’s Battle for the Beetle: The Untold Story of the Post-War Battle for Adolf
Hitler’s Giant Volkswagen Factory and the Porsche-Designed Car that Became an Icon for
Generations around the Globe. Ludvigsen analyzes the Allies’ post-war scramble for control of
Volkswagen and reveals the process by which Volkswagen, the car, the factory, and its patents,
stayed in Germany. Ludvigsen is the first to do this and draws on an impressive list of secondary
literature, as well as intelligence reports, newspaper and magazine articles, and personal
interviews. Ludvigsen’s main contribution to the Volkswagen narrative is overturning the
misconception presented by James J. Flink that there was little Allied interest in acquiring
control over the car firm.56 Instead, Ludvigsen’s technically adroit case studies of American,
British, French, Russian, and Belgian attempts to poach the small vehicle divulges the
significance the Allies placed on either obtaining or sabotaging the Volkswagen project. As
Battle for the Beetle is primarily a text about the creation of post-war Germany, it has the
potential to speak to a wide audience of German historians; however, Ludvigsen fails to connect
to larger historical debates because his books are marketed toward automobile enthusiasts and
not academics. The trade-off is that his technical analysis is unmatched, and borders, at times,
on becoming a shop manual. Ludvigsen expertly uses technical history to point to cultural
attitudes. For each of the countries who vied for the Volkswagen plant he explores how foreign
manufacturers paralleled experiments with techniques and technologies along the same lines of
the development of the Volkswagen and considers how the car would be accepted in that
country.
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Given the limitation of technology as a means of understanding cultural phenomenon like
the Beetle, and since the narrative of the technical development of the Beetle has been completed
by Hopfinger, Ludvigsen, and others, it is time to move on. What is now needed is for historians
to access new types of sources in an effort to place the Beetle into the larger context of car
culture. German car culture studies should aspire to Cotton Seiler’s excellent book from 2008;
Republic of Drivers, A Cultural History of Automobility in America. Seiler warns his readers at
the outset that his book’s “essential questions are cultural, philosophical, and political, not
automotive nor technological nor even psychological, narrowly defined.”57 Fulfilling this
promise, he then analyzes how the automobile encompasses individuality in the context of the
self, gender, and race.
More recently two book have been published which move towards understanding the car
as more than the technological sum of its parts: Andrea Hiott’s Thinking Small: The Long,
Strange Trip of the Volkswagen Beetle and Bernhard Rieger’s The People’s Car: A Global
History of the Volkswagen Beetle. While Hiott’s work attempts to understand the Beetle as a
product of thinking differently, the books real strengths are in creating the biographies of the
main figures of the already familiar Volkswagen story, with the addition of an in depth account
of the advertising firm Doyle, Dane, and Bernbach (DDB) to whom she attributes much of
Volkswagen’s ultimate success. She does not approach the cultural meaning of the automobile
in national contexts, which would show how the automobile differs in meaning for Germans and
Americans. Instead, she sees the Beetle as a challenge to conventional thinking in both
countries. By doing so, she fails to acknowledge the distinct car cultures. Rieger’s work focuses
on the modernizing aspects of the Beetle’s life. His work is exceptional and thorough. The book
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does not make the common mistake of failing to set the Beetle into the larger car culture
developing within Germany. In many ways, The People’s Car is the long awaited book that
finally enters into the cultural discourse with Wolfgang Sachs’ 1984 book, Die Liebe zum
Automobil: Ein Ruckblick in die Geschichte unserer Wünsche.58 This is all the more impressive
considering that Sachs' book has long been considered the foundational work on German car
culture.59
Going beyond Hitler, Volkswagen’s story offers insights into how West Germans
reconstructed their identity after the war. While looking to America and its European neighbors,
Germany repurposed German traditions for the ends of constructing a new identity. At times,
German car culture developed in parallel patterns with American car culture, it took from
American technologies of manufacturing, it appropriated systems of management, yet ultimately,
the car had a different cultural meaning in the two nations.
II . Capitalism with a Human Face
As a company (Volkswagen AG) Volkswagen’s achievement in Germany is divided
between two major realizations: that it brought mass motorization to Germany and that it became
an economic powerhouse by exporting on the global stage. Volkswagen AG’s corporate policies
helped to reinforce the significance of the Beetle to the German public through production. In
the 1980s and 1990s German firms, and especially Volkswagen, were applauded for pioneering a
German model of economic organization and production that defied the normal Taylorist
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mentality by instead promoting “Diversified Quality Production.”60 German automobile
manufacturers use of multi-purpose machinery rather than single purpose equipment is but one
indicator of how Diversified Quality Production contrasts Taylorist or Fordist methods.61 In
opposition to many American firms’ practices, the German model proposed that profits can be
maintained while simultaneously promoting wages and working conditions by working with
labor unions. The German model also promoted investment in human capital through more
intensive training programs which improved the quality of the final product and helped worker
retention by turning jobs into careers. Under this model the large corporation utilized smaller
regional companies to provide semi-finished goods such as seats or car body panels in what is
called “flexible specialization.”62 While this favored the worker, it also helped the firm as Sigurt
Vitols noted it, “creates constraints which are beneficial for employers, in the sense that they are
forced to focus on their long-term interests rather than short-term market shocks.”63 It is also
notable that rather than outsourcing, the German companies favored exporting their system root
and branch to both developing and developed nations. This model is justified because
Volkswagen, and other German producers, believed that the discerning customer would pay a
premium for high quality products.64
Coming to terms with this German model of production and corporate behavior reached a
high point of interest in the 1980s and 1990s, at a moment when self-interested capitalism and
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mass production were increasingly viewed as destructive. In an attempt to posit ‘flexible
specialization’ as an alternative to mass production, many economists and commentators traced
back its development to the Wilhelminian economic world.65 There is much to suggest that
Diversified Quality Production of the 1980s owes much of its development to the crisis of
modernizing Germany that began in the late nineteenth century. Yet, in the attempt to propose
an alternative, these “optimist” commentators were blinded to certain historical realities,
including the marginal power that the Mittelstand (small shopkeepers and craftsmen) had in
curtailing the progress of industrialization, since as David Blackbourn notes, “If there is a red
thread that runs through state policy [it is] the recognition that a modern, efficient industry was
indispensable for a successful great power.”66 Far from rejecting the importance of
developments like flexible specialization, Blackbourn notes that optimist accounts, “remind us
that small producers played a genuinely important role even in the age of Krupp and Siemans.
The optimist case is nevertheless an oversimplification. In many ways it represents the mirror
image of the pessimist accounts. One approach sees industrialization as a juggernaut destroying
the old craft world; the other presents it as a vehicle for advancement.”67 Yet, even if the
Mittelstand had limited political support in Wilhelmine Germany, their claims concerning the
nature of technology and industrialization and its effects on the quality of finished goods
provided a cultural and intellectual platform to understand and criticize the modernization of
Germany.
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Even mass production in the large factory functioned differently in the German model.
Since quality in the final product justifies the capital investments required for the German model,
production is integral to understanding the value of a product like the Volkswagen Beetle which
was partly sold on the claim of high quality. One of the important continuities in how the Beetle
was sold in Germany and the United States was by claiming superiority in the production process
itself by highlighting the human in the factory. The difference between automated and
mechanized production processes and old world craftsmanship is that machines, by nature, treat
every process as generalized phenomenon, whereas the craftsman can respond to the specifics of
a situation. Volkswagen was able to have the best of both worlds through their extensive
inspection system where the discerning human would ensure that metal did not become too thin
when pressed into body panels or that paint achieved good coverage and did not leave runs. The
inspector, who was sometimes portrayed as a scientist in a lab coat, personified the production
process and by focusing on the human aspect of the car, Volkswagen put a human face on the
production of the car.68
In two print advertisements created by the American advertising firm DDB emphasized
the role of the inspector in the production process. An American Ad appeared in 1963
demonstrated the number of the checks performed on every Volkswagen by showing a car signed
by each inspector at the Volkswagen factory. The ad continued this theme of quality assurance
through a written account of the consequences for failure: rather than repairing the defect the part
is “smashed… down to a metal lump and thrown out into the scrape pile.”69 In Germany an
advertisement appeared in Der Spiegel in 1964. This ad featured a test for determining color
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blindness with the outline of a Beetle in red hues. The text pronounced, “If you cannot see the
VW you cannot become a VW inspector.” The fine print of this ad focuses on the intense
scrutiny of inspection that the VW must pass. The ad claims that, “our inspectors must see what
others over look.”70
The human in the factory became a reoccurring focal point. In another American ad from
1968 showed two images below which there were two statements. The first showed a group of
men assembling a Volkswagen which carried the text, “It is what we do here,” and the second
image showed a finished Beetle in a parking lot under which is written, “that makes a difference
here.”71 Importantly, the first picture was very personal, there are no discernible tools or
machinery and everyone pictured is engrossed in their work. All of this is to say that
Volkswagen believed that production mattered; it mattered for the final product, it mattered for
marketing, and it mattered to the customer.
To understand the significance of the Volkswagen, it is necessary to evaluate it not just as
a company or a car, but rather as a particular solution to particular problems that modernizing
Germany faced. Thus, even though the Volkswagen would not be sold to the public until 1948,
the story of the Volkswagen begins much earlier. A genealogy that looks to the roots of the
Volkswagen could trace back cultural trends and certain core concepts, like German
craftsmanship, work and mass production, materialism and consumerism, to periods that would
predate the invention of the automobile. Fortunately, this is not necessary to do because the
pertinent discussions come to the surface at the turn of the century and reach a boiling point in
the crises of the 1920s. Since the 1920s was the foundational time for the concept of a
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Volkswagen, or a people’s car, most histories of the Volkswagen begin in the 1920s. Designers,
manufacturers, and social commentators attempted to imagine a mass culture of cars as they
worried about the social, economic, and ethical implications. Yet, these conversations accepted
an American way of production and consumption as a foregone conclusion, which these
commentators then used as a point of departure for defining a German way of production and
consumption which remained theoretical due to the devastation of WWI. Since the 1920s are
particularly fertile ground for the concept of the Volkswagen, it is beneficial to sketch the
developments that led to Germany’s car culture at that time. Wilhelmine Germany is doubly
important for understanding German and American trajectories since, as Volker R. Berghahn
notes, “much is to be said for the view that the turn of the century represents a better starting
point for examining German-American industrial relations … for it was around 1900 at the Paris
World Exhibition, that the United States moved into the telescopes of the Europeans as an
industrial power to be reckoned with in the future.”72
A. Production and Car Design in Wilhelmine Germany
The early days of car development proved to be far from definitive. James Flink looks at
the production outputs of motorizing countries and shows how the global automotive hub shifted
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several times before World War I from Germany to Paris to Detroit.73 While production output
is a good indicator of car culture, as it indirectly shows the supply and demand of cars, this
approach only outlines the shape of car culture. Wolfgang Sachs’ observations in For Love of
the Automobile: Looking Back into the History of Our Desires helps to add some color and
features to the general shape that production outputs provide.74 While these two authors are
writing very different types of histories with different methods and purposes, there are some
comparable points which can be evaluated and challenged.
Whether one is discussing the 1920s, 1930s, or 1950s, it is counterproductive to look for
German adoption of the automobile as a single event, or as an import into a vacuum. Along with
Great Britain, France, and the United States, Germany was one of the founding nations of the
automobile, and the major developments that followed are tied to this position. Many tout the
German Carl Benz’s three-wheeled creation showcased at the 1889 Paris Exposition as the first
car.75 Even today, German companies have retained their original monikers, in brands like
Daimler, Benz, and Maybach, which were all founded by their namesake engineers and designers
from fin de siècle Germany. Some technologies, such as diesel combustion developed by Rudolf
Diesel, also betray the central role Germany played in the initial development of the
automobile.76 The first version of an electric hybrid car was designed and built by the young
Ferdinand Porsche in the summer of 1901; it was also the world’s first four-wheel drive
vehicle.77 These developments were not created in isolation. Car developers around the world

73

Flink, The Automobile Age, 15-27.
Wolfgang Sachs, For Love of the Automobile: Looking Back into the History of our Desires,
Trans. Don Reneau, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) ; James Flink, America
Adopts the Automobile, 1895-1910 (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1970).
75
Flink, The Automobile Age, 12.
76
Ibid.
77
Hopfinger, The Volkswagen Story, 22.
74

31

were in a technological discourse through print such as “engineering journals, bicycle
periodicals, automobile trade journals, newspapers and popular magazines of the day,” as well as
through exhibition.78 Despite the global exchange of technological information at the dawn of
the new century, most of the key developments in creating the automobile were fashioned by
Germans.79
These technological achievements reflect Germany’s experience with cultural modernity,
as they grew in the shadow of a society transformed. In Blackbourn’s periodization of German
history, he uses the label the “Age of Progress” to describe the period from 1849-1880.80
Following this progress, by the 1880s Germany had become an exporting powerhouse in the
realm of finished goods, noticeably, the automobile and automobile parts. The most notable
export was Gottlieb Daimler’s internal combustion gasoline engine which car manufacturers
built their cars around in the United States, Great Britain, France, and also in Germany.81
German garage-based automotive operations enjoyed the growth of purchasing power afforded
by the general expansion and availability of credit.82 Increase in leisure time aided the
development of mass culture; the rise of the department store marked the beginning of mass
consumption.83 In short, as Sachs verifies:
The Wilhelminian era – contrary to its reputation – was eager to modernize… it
was the classic age of progress. Whoever had the money could acquire electrical
light in the 1890s, enjoy new mobility with the bicycle, write letters on a
typewriter and admire the first moving picture show.84
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Prosperity, the rise of mass culture, and new forms of consumption put Germany in a
position to become the heir apparent in the automobile age. Automotive historian James Flink
claims this is best seen by the 1901 Mercedes, which he considers the first modern car.
According to Flink, “Nothing better illustrates the early superiority of European automotive
design than the sharp contrast between this first Mercedes model and the 1901 American 3horsepower, curved dash Olds[mobile], which was in significant respects merely a motorized
horse buggy.”85 The differences between these two cars are more than just design. It is not just
that the Mercedes was more refined, but that the car was traveling in different cultural directions
in Germany and the United States. The refinement in design marks the divide in the prevailing
concepts of what the car was to become, and subsequently who should own one. The 1901 Olds
demonstrates that America’s central concern with the automobile was developing not just the car,
but also systems of organization that could create increased output. The Mercedes, on the other
hand, utilized the same types of innovative design which accompanied the technological
development responsible for creating the seachange of technology brought on by early
automobiles. The difference was that while American car companies focused on broadening the
access of the current automobile, Germany was developing the car to new levels. Thus, the cars,
like the 1901 Mercedes, were hand-crafted works of art, and by comparison the Olds seemed
primitive.
This characterization, that American industry was managed by output and German
industry was obsessed with quality, has its limitations. It has all too commonly been constructed
in automotive histories with the presentism of Henry Ford’s dual contribution to the world: the
Model T and Fordism. Flink points out that before 1914, “automobiles were made and sold
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much the same way on both sides of the Atlantic, that is, they were assembled from jobbed-out
components by a crew of skilled mechanics and unskilled helpers at low rates of labor
productivity, and they were sold at high prices and high unit profits.”86 Flink sharply turns from
this observation to set Fordism in a longer historical context based on rationalized management.
Flink’s main task is to show why the United States adopted the automobile a generation ahead of
Europe, yet he is content to say that Europe adopted the automobile for the same reasons and in
the same ways as the United States, only years later.87
Many scholars, observing the commonalties between the Ford Model T and the Beetle
make a special point to evaluate Ford’s methods as a means of understanding Volkswagen.88
Ford and his humble car had momentous effects, observed globally, which captured the
imagination of the world not only in regards to the automobile, but also as a vision of the future.
This vision was constructed as a dream or nightmare depending on the source, yet irrespective of
the critic or proponent’s position, Ford’s brave new world alluded to the relationship between
man and machine, and between worker and manager. Ford’s organization, based on
interchangeable parts, mechanized semiskilled labor, and conformity of product, constituted
what became known internationally as the “American model of production,” or, later, as
Fordism.89 Even though ‘true’ Fordism was short lived in the American automotive world, as it
was an industrial model of production unable to cope with post-industrial demands, it is
understood as the starting point of the mass cultural experience of the automobile. Therefore,
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Ford, his car, and his industrial philosophy contribute greatly to the international association of
automobiles as an America symbol.
Before the First World War, there was no way to predict that American production
methods would, at least momentarily, establish superiority. Andrea Hiott elucidates this point by
drawing on Douglas Brinkley’s work Wheels for the World when she says, “In retrospect we can
talk about 1908 as the birth of Ford’s Model T, the time when ‘the people’ got a car, in fact, all
Ford had that year was ‘a wonderful car – one, single, wonderful car.’ … ‘At the time Ford
himself wondered aloud whether his company would ever build even a tenth Model T.”’90
Neither in the United States nor in Europe were auto manufactures near to dreaming of mass
motorization, which could cut across class lines and see workers as a consumer. Moreover, it is
doubtful that in these early stages of car manufacturing one could distinguish an American
method from a German method. Flink maintains that despite the lack of difference between
production methods, “as early as the turn of the century, it was accepted as axiomatic that, unlike
European producers ‘American manufacturers have set about to produce machines in quantity, so
that the price can be reduced.”’91 This allows Flink to show how Fordism was a “perfected”
model of the existing American manufacturing process.92 Oldsmobile and Mercedes serve as
examples only because they survived the initial technological gold rush of automobile
manufacturing. Many more companies in both countries folded and failed than survived, which
gives the comparison some Darwinian credibility, but only in the way that these methods created
national images of production, and only in hindsight.
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Even if this narrative of production does not capture the total story of motorization, it is
useful in showing how notions of the automobile differed in different national contexts.
Describing the motivating factors for why Europe, and Germany in particular, worked to refine
their automobiles to appeal to the higher classes has only been approached objectively through
economic explanations, which largely ignore Germany’s rising prestige, economic power, and
geographic need.93 Leslie Butterfield takes a simpler approach by relying on the romantic,
positive stereotype of German craftsmanship that compels Germans to perfectionism in whatever
they undertake.94 For Butterfield this is more of a description of an ancient national character
tied to German inwardness than a development of German consumerism in the twentieth century.
In sum, the German penchant for quality is an explanation in itself for Butterfield--- an end
rather than a beginning.
As such, the most troubling aspect of Flink’s account on the differences between
European and American car production is that it does not seem to correlate with the larger image
of a transforming Germany that Blackbourn and Sachs describe. After all, Germany’s rise in
prestige and power was palpable enough to concern the other world powers on the eve of the
First World War. Bernard P. Bellon reconciles these divergent images of Germany’s second
industrialization, which he summarizes as “later, faster, bigger, newer,” when he simply states
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that “the German motor vehicle industry fell outside of this [industrializing] pattern.”95 Bellon
dismisses any meaningful analysis of why this would occur and simply remarks that “there was
no German counterpart to Henry Ford.”96 These endeavors fail to recognize what Sachs most
elegantly notes, that “technology is the material reproduction of culture.”97 That is to say, there
were cultural reasons that America would produce a figure like Ford, while Germany continued
to hammer out cars by hand. Many ready-made cultural explanations already exist from other
studies on German modernization, and it would be easy to expand these problematic theories to
show how Germany had an automotive Innerlichkeit (inwardness). As inwardness would be tied
to Butterfield’s reliance on the stereotype of German craftsmanship, such an interpretation would
be unsatisfactory in that it does not probe deeply into why quality and craftsmanship where more
valued in German culture. Blackbourn debunks the notion of overt inwardness and antimaterialism as the majority experience in late nineteenth century Germany by showing how
“attitudes towards material progress were more often jubilant.”98 Yet, even Blackbourn
acknowledges that there was an ambiguity in reactions to these notions of progress, which, “in so
far as it was seriously challenged, this would come only in the decades before the First World
War.”99
Turning to the attitudes and opinions of the public regarding the automobile before 1914,
Flink describes the American experience: “No industry in history developed in a more favorable
climate of public opinion.”100 Flink seems to forget Woodrow Wilson’s 1906 diatribe against
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automobiles: “Automobilists are a picture of arrogance and wealth… Nothing has spread
socialist feeling in this country more than the automobile.”101 Indeed, the outrage that Wilson
felt toward the automobile was also experienced in Germany. Following a passage from Rudolf
Diesels’ journal entry after driving through Italy in 1906, he describes the large dust plumbs
which blanketed angry pedestrians. Sachs notes that, “little wonder, too, that the rage blended
with class hatred, for those who raced along the country and village streets, who drove speedily
off leaving peasants with the mess, were indeed those nouveaux riches from the cities.”102
Patton recalls similar accounts involving Willie Vanderbilt on the streets of Newport, Rhode
Island.103
While these problems, which accompanied the early adoption of the automobile, are
scarcely covered in American narratives of the automobile, Sachs begins his book with the
conflicts the automobile caused in everyday life. It is difficult to tell if the roots of the two
automotive trajectories stem from this initial experience as presented in the literature, that
America was more open to the automobile than Germany, or if it is a problem of presentism
within the historiography of American car culture. Including Patton’s account, it seems that the
prewar cultural experience and expectation of the automobile was matched note for note in
America and in Germany. Even if there was more opposition to the automobile in Germany,
Sachs shows how the “automobile question” became reframed into a nationalistic question
concerned with maintaining German industrial development.104 Flink notes that by “1903, the
belief that the automobile would soon supersede the horse was commonplace,” which is
intonated by Sachs’ citation of the Allgemeine Automobil-Zeitung in 1906, which proclaimed,
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“The automobile: it will grant to human beings their conquest over time and space by virtue of
its speed and forward motion.”105
By the standards which would make mass motorization possible, both the United States
and Germany were far from reaching levels of output which could cater to the masses. Yet,
before 1908, when Ford first put his Model T into production, it was still an idea yet to be
conceived in the world, and would be far from proven until almost the 1920’s, when the Model T
would become the first “people’s car,” or as Ford envisioned it “universal car,” in the world.
Therefore, the car in both cases served as a sharp divider of class. Sachs’ work on German car
culture and Flink’s more comprehensive work shows that there are still more commonalities
between the two societies in relation to the emerging automobile. The simple answer to why
America became the “classic land of the automobile,” and not Germany, was that even before
1903 and the founding of the Ford Motor Car company, America was increasingly and rapidly
becoming the image of modernity in European eyes, and with such interest, the American ethos
became divisive.106
As if to demonstrate this principle, there were some early failed attempts to appropriate
American methods in the pre-war era. Berghahn notes that the electrical company, Bosch,
traveled to the United States by 1914 to observe the Taylorist methods which they attempted to
employ on their factory floor. Located just down the street from the Daimler-Benz (DB) factory,
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DB executives would have had a good view of the massive Metal Workers Union strike against
the new “Bosch Tempo.”107 Berghahn continues by saying, “other employers also opposed this
kind of ‘Americanization,’ Daimler-Benz among them. They believed that what was coming
from across the Atlantic was not suited to German industrial conditions and principles.”108
Blackbourn reveals the workers’ concerns with “increased pace of work… also raised the spectre
of deskilling, the fear that those who sold their labor were becoming more interchangeable, and
thus dispensable. The skilled craftsman could see himself threatened…[by] the fate of the mass
worker.”109 This feeling also coincided with the growth of the trade unions in Germany, which
underwent unprecedented growth in the pre-war years, from 300,000 members in 1890 to 2.5
million in 1913.110 Thus, “the labour movement was a fixed point in a turning world, fostering a
common identity,” which lead to “political ferment at the base of German society,” which grew
from the lifting of the anti-socialist laws of the 1870-90s.111
Thus, while it is possible to see a particular strain of production taking root in America,
German attempts were much less consorted. Instead of having a definite German system, one
can see how German production was configured by constraints that were not present in the
United States. Strong labor unions’ resistance to mechanization inhibited producers’ abilities to
streamline production by replacing skilled labor with semi-skilled workers. Political support for
the Mittelstand, even at a token level, further complicated a comprehensive embrace of
standardization and mechanization. While this support did little to remedy the industrializing
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process, it acknowledged the superiority of hand-build products and imbued the concept of
quality with a sense of spirituality which can contrast the soullessness of the machined good.
The lending system for business prevalent in Germany before the war also complicated
how companies enacted policies, as large banks had a major role in how the lent capital could be
used. Large banks would often lend with the caveat that the bank would have representation on
the corporate board of directors. To fill these positions, Bank’s often hired corporate executives
which created a revolving door effect as executives left corporations to work for the bank and
then returned to work for the company.112 Later, many executives would serve on the board on
behalf of the company, the bank, while serving on the board of competitor companies which
would create conflicts of interest and a general state of confusion.113 For example, in 1926, after
serving on the board of trustees for both Daimler and Benz on behalf of Deutsche Bank, Emil
George von Stauss forced a merger to create an “economically irreplaceable corporation,” in
essence, an automotive cartel that was too big to fail.114
Yet, none of these developments completely prevented the German automotive industry
from making greater moves toward a Fordist future. Ultimately, the large producers were eager
to move to mass production despite these impediments. The business decision to stay the course
was based on a much more basic problem. Benz and others would have been happy to convert
their factories for mass production if only they had something to sell and someone to sell it to.
While Germans would be fascinated by aspects of Ford and Fordism, the man, his production
techniques, his welfare capitalism, Ford’s car itself would escape this fascination as German
automobiles were far more technologically and stylistically advanced. They realized that the
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luxurious cars for the elites which composed their current market were not suitable for mass
consumption and that if Germany was to reach mass motorization it would require a different
design. Designing such a car was not a high priority because Germany lacked the “income
revolution” that was taking place in the United States.115
The upper class and nouveau riche were instrumental in the development of the car on
both sides of the Atlantic. Even in America, the car for the common person was still considered
unlikely. But the American model was able to expand for the swelling customer base, making it
possible to produce in a volume that would allow more and more people to drive. Mass
motorization of Germany was always dealt with as something for which to prepare in the future
and not a reality that could be dealt with in the present moment.
Yet, this economic problem was understood and couched in cultural terms as it became a
fulcrum which German critics and proponents of the “American system” could pry by citing
fundamental differences between Germany and America. For many Germans, this system was
holistic, as so, production methods, political economy, cultural development in the arts, and
social developments fit hand in glove together. Against this backdrop powerful illiberal
narratives developed that purported alternatives to American hedonism and consumerism.116
These voices would help constitute much of the rhetoric of the National Socialists backlash
against the progress of self interested capitalism.
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Even though mass production did not take root before the First World War in Germany,
German car culture did continue to grow. The remarkable aspect of car culture is that it can
develop, as it did in Germany, with relatively few automobiles on the road. Car culture is as
much about aspirations as it is ownership. As such, the German image of the automobile
continued to develop in the Weimar period. One way car culture continued to grow in the
absence of cars, which is rarely explored, is through motor sport and, more specifically, the
spectacle of Grand Prix racing. Another avenue of growth is through writings in trade and
popular journals where visionaries such as Josef Ganz imagine the future of automobiles and
continue to see Germany as central to its development. In the years from 1904-1933 the German
forms of production play a central role in keeping the car ‘German,’ at least in their own
understanding of the differences between the definition of American and German cars. As
mechanization was deferred for the more labor intensive process, many more German workers
experienced this aspect of car culture. Mass motorization remains out of reach in the Weimar
Republic; however, as a national issue, motorization of Germany gains a sense of urgency. The
government would draft plans for a new system of highways and manufacturers moved forward
with plans that would put a larger number of people behind the wheel despite the unstable
financial situation. There was no cohesive opposition to modernization, even within the trade
unions, but rather fractured complaints about some of the tradeoffs and byproducts, which was
enough to shape German car culture’s future.
B. Small Cars for the Little People, Practical Cars for the German People
In 1925 the Berliner Illustrirte Zeitung published a comic that showed two wealthy men
assembled around a grotesquely large automobile. Attached to the running boards of the titanic
vehicle was a small automobile. The 1st gentleman begins: “A Fabulous Car! But why is there a
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small car mounted to the sideboard?” The second man replies: “Oh, the Chauffeur uses that
when he needs to go around the car to inspect car troubles.”117
German car culture in the1920s moved in two different directions. One school of thought
for automotive design continually pushed the innovation and refinement that was typical in
Wilhelmine Germany. These machines, fused with new aesthetics and modern notions, would
remain limited to the higher levels of society. The 1920s also saw an impulse to broaden access
to the automobile which gained enthusiasm under a common assumption that a nation on wheels
would fundamentally change daily life and remake social structure. Yet, at both levels German
car cultures attempted to define itself against other national car cultures. The cartoon above
appeared in a September issue of the Berliner Illustrirte Zeitung ridiculing British luxury cars for
their size. Even though the caricature remains generalized, a few points about the car make it
stand out as British, and specifically, a Rolls Royce 40/50 Silver Ghost. First, the top of the
steering wheel juts out over the right hand side of the car, which, in a time before Australian and
Japanese car manufacturing, could only make it a British car. The hood ornament retains the
general shape of the “Spirit of Ecstasy,” the art deco miniature sculpture that peered over the
radiators of most Rolls Royce cars, and the general lines of the car, despite its exaggerated size,
fits with the later models of Rolls Royce Silver Ghost 40/50. Yet, as a Mercedes advertisement
in the same magazine in the same year, indicates, exaggerated stature seems, if British, to have
some currency in Germany, as it shows the Mercedes drawn at the same dimensions as a train.118
German criticism of British luxuries went beyond size. An ad absurdum take on British
luxury cars appeared later in the year titled, “Car with every convinence,” which pictured a car
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with built in garden, makeup mirror for the modern woman in the back, dog house, and various
other uneccesary additions.119 The British flag flying over the weather vain and the bull dog in
the dog house give the car away as another English example. The Berliner Illustrirte Zeitung
published an illustrated article that covered the Berlin Auto Show that expressed the same
sentiments saying that “The German Auto industry, to a larger degree than other European
countries, is not so much concerned with bringing out new designs, rather to make its production
methods so efficient to enable a substantial reduction of the price of the products.”120 The author
believed that the thrust of innovation would be aimed at “making the car a device which can be
operated without any in-depth technical knowledge,” since “the modern automobile is, and has
been for a fairly long while, already such a perfected design that there is nothing more essential
to improve on it.”121 In a much more even handed manner the author addresses the function of
the car and dispels the notion that the automobile industry should push innovation further from
the general public. The fact that the Berliner Illustrirte Zeitung is by no means proletariat, in the
1920s the magazine embraces the cosmopolitan and modern achievements of German society,
indicates the broader reach of the enthusiasm of expanding access to the automobile.
What remained unclear in 1925 was the degree that redesign was necessary to these
goals. Germany’s failure to accomplish this task of mass motorization gives shape to much of
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the historigraphical understanding of Weimar’s car culture. When describing the interwar
period, Bernhard Rieger insists that:
In the twenties, even the most benevolent commentators would have struggled to
portray Germany as a car nation. While the public was well aware that Germany
lagged far behind other countries in terms of the automobile’s proliferation, the
topic never rose to the top of the public agenda. Debates about car matters were
pushed into the background by the repeated social, political, and economic crises
and conflicts that afflicted Weimar Germany. The country’s low car ownership
levels attracted limited public note because the issue itself elicited little public
controversy. Among analysts, a broad consensus existed regarding the numerous
material obstacles that made mass motorization a prospect far beyond Germany’s
horizon. As a result, calls to remedy this situation, for instance by designing a car
for the wider population, surfaced merely intermittently. The idea of a ‘people’s
car’ never gained sharp public contours in the Weimar Republic but remained a
rather fuzzy notion.122
Despite these two connected conclusions, first that the Weimar Republic was not a car
nation, and second, that the concept of the Volkswagen123 remained secondary to the issues that
plagued the Weimar Republic, the interwar period witnessed radical transformations in the
mental world of the German automobile. Mass production of the automobile was stifled in
Wilhelmine Germany partly because car design had developed away from the common man.
Yet, Weimar Germany was full of optimism that the car could become more than a plaything of
the wealthy. The Volkswagen, as Hiott points out, “was a generic term” for an inexpensive car
for the people that was widely discussed in the 1920s.124 Indeed, in 1923 the automotive
publication Automobile-Revue published an article by Josef Ganz, which imagined that
things will develop with the automobile as they did for the horse, the railway, and
the bicycle. Not the grand automobile, which for a long time, if not forever, will
belong only to a small, privileged minority, but the middle-sized and especially

122

Rieger, The People’s Car, 13.
Volkswagen (in italics) indicates the concept of the Volkswagen, a small “people’s car” rather
than what we have come to know as the Volkswagen i.e. the Beetle or Volkswagen the company.
124
Hiott, Thinking Small, 8.
123

46

the small car…The day will come – more quickly than we think- when everyone
will have a place in the garage.125
The article goes on to imagine that one day the cost of the automobile might be included in one’s
rent, as a modern luxury equivalent to “gas, electricity, bathrooms, and central heating.”126 In
the same year this article was written, Ganz started designing a very small car, which he called
the Ganz-Klein-Wagen, pun assumedly intended.127 The most notable small car attempting to
cater to the masses during the Weimar period came from German manufacturer Opel.
This automotive promise is evident in General Motors’ interest in creating a presence in
Germany in 1928 when it acquired Opel. General Motors believed that Germany was a growth
market, despite the shocks of runaway inflation and unemployment earlier in the decade. GM
wagered that Germany’s economy and democratic government was stabilizing as “many sectors
of [German] industry had attained or surpassed prewar output,” and “rising incomes [was]
stimulating demand for cars.”128 Proof of this demand was evidenced as early as 1924 with
Opel’s own compact car, a clear forerunner to the Volkswagen, which was mass produced in a
3.5 Million square foot factory using American equipment and production techniques.129 Yet,
Opel’s implementation of these processes was much more of an exception than a rule. Likewise,
Ford moved from an assembly shop in Berlin to a full production facility in 1929 at Cologne.
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Within five years Ford had dozens of small factories across Germany manufacturing parts and
assembling cars and trucks.130
As Sachs notes, “In 1924 Opel introduced assembly-line production and copied, almost
centimeter for centimeter, the Citroën [a French manufacturer] –without license, but,” breaking
with the traditional black paint that was considered standard, the car donned with the “green
paint job [that inspired] the name ‘Tree Frog,’”131 Officially, the car was named the Opel 4PS,
and although the car was mechanically crude it received its affectionate name for its appearance
and simplicity.132 As Hiott notes, the car was “a big step in Germany at the time because it sold
well, a sign that the common man did indeed want greater mobility.”133 The manufacturer
Hanomag also produced a cheap small car which it advertised in Berliner Illustrirte Zeitung in
1926.134 Along the same lines, the BMW Dixi began production in 1928.135 These cars all failed
due to technological inadequacies and low build quality, yet they mark a serious growth in the
cultural interest of a motorized Germany.
The genesis of a car design which had the potential to become a Volkswagen arrived as
early as 1921. First, Porsche designed a small car for Austro-Daimler called the Sascha.136
Unsure of the concept of a car for the common man, Austro-Daimler commissioned Porsche to
build it as a race car.137 Following its success on the track, which received international
recognition, the Viennese Motoring Paper noted, “if there was ever to be a design for a ‘car of
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the little man’ one day, then surely it would come from something like this.”138 Second, in this
same year, the Austrian engineer Edmund Rumpler’s car, the Tropfen-Auto, or drop car, named
after its tear drop shape, was presented to the public at the Berlin Auto Show.139 Rumpler’s car
was called “the star of the Berlin Show.”140 Although visually unusual, as it resembled a boat
rather than a car, the design had philosophical and technological similarities to the car Ferdinand
Porsche would ultimately design and Hitler would approve. First, the car’s atypical shape is one
of the earliest attempts at what would later be called streamlining, or using aerodynamics to
govern the car’s shape. Another idiosyncrasy common to both cars was that the engine was rearmounted.141 Following this development a new school of thought in automotive design emerged
from the concept of mounting the engine over the rear axle. The prevailing logic was that
moving the engine closer to the drive wheels cut down on the number of parts in the power train
by eliminating the long driveshaft or propeller shaft. Also, when positioned correctly, this put
the weight of the engine over the drive wheels which improved traction and handling. Josef
Ganz was in attendance at the opening of the auto show and, inspired by the Tropfen-Auto’s
design, he wrote to the automotive publication Klein Motor Sport in 1922. Ganz’s letter outlined
the fundamental elements that could constitute a Volkswagen which would offer an alternative to
the motorcycle. The car would have “an air-cooled, four stroke, rear-mounted ‘horizontally
opposed’ or ‘boxer’ engine made of lightweight alloy, built as a single unit with a clutch and
three-speed gearbox [transmission].”142
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Beyond Ganz, the car had other admirers. First among them were the designers and
executives at Benz who sought to buy licensing rights for the Tropfen-Auto. Putting the car into
production, however, faced some serious challenges. The chassis and suspension proved to be
inadequate. That, coupled with Rumpler’s dissatisfaction with the deal Benz offered for full
licensing, led to the decision to modify the car into a grand prix racer for the 1923 racing
season.143 The car proved itself on the racetrack at Monza earning Benz a gold medal.144
During Porsche’s time as Technical Director at Daimler-Benz, Porsche developed
projects that ranged from motorcycle designs to aircraft engines to high performance racecar.
Yet one of the projects that served to unify Porsche’s life work was the design of a small,
affordable and reliable car. His last project at Daimler-Benz, after the difficulties Benz
experienced getting licensing to produce the Tropfen-Auto, was to create a report “for cars much
smaller than the company normally produced,” including one called 5/25 and a car based on a
1.2 liter air cooled rear engine “with independent suspension and a semi-monocoque body.”145
These features would constitute the basic formula for the Volkswagen Beetle.146 Ludvigsen
notes that Benz engineer Josef Müller went on the record as saying, “A new era of popular
motorization was announcing itself. This is reason enough to think anew about the overall
design of the car, especially its space utilization.”147 Rejecting Porsche’s design of the 5/25,
Daimler-Benz decided to return to the basic design of the Tropfen-Auto to create a new model:
the Mercedes-Benz Type 130. The company soon discovered that they had erred by placing the
engine too far back, which made the car unwieldy to drive.
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Designing a functional small car entailed a whole new set of challenges than those
experienced with designing a full sized car. Longer and wider wheelbases provide a more stable
platform which affects the cars traction and handling and its ability to absorb shocks. A larger
car can house a larger and simpler engine. Hiott illuminates this struggle when she says,
“making a small version of one of the more advanced cars like Hitler’s beloved Mercedes was an
idea that proved both economically and technologically flawed: The type of engine, the design,
the materials, and especially the expense, simply did not allow for a car that was ‘the same, but
smaller.’”148 The small modern car was truly a unique problem for Weimar German and a lifelong passion for Porsche.
After working on a variety of projects for Austro-Daimler and Daimler-Benz, Porsche,
famous in his own right as a designer, decided to leave Daimler-Benz and create his own
consulting firm in 1928. He opened his doors in April of 1931 in Stuttgart, “Dr. Ing. H.c. F.
Porsche Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, Konstruktionen und Beratungen für Motoren
und Fahrzeugbau.”149 Porsche surrounded himself with family members and a few pilfered
designers from established firms including his long time friend and second in command, Karl
Rabe.150 Stuttgart was the logical home for Porsche’s new venture with its proximity to the
electrical firm Bosch, piston manufacturer Mahle, engine component manufacturer Hirth, and the
coachworks (body work) of Reutters.151 There he would continue to work on designs under
contracts from other car manufacturers with more freedom in selecting projects. Porsche
numbered the projects his company undertook and Project 12, commissioned by the motorcycle
manufacturer Zündapp, was slated to be a small car for the common man. Projects 1-6 are lost to
148
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history or, as some have speculated, Porsche started with Project 7 to make the business look
more viable. 152 The designers at Porsche dropped everything to complete Project 12 on the tight
deadline of three months.153 The designs for Zündapp produced three prototypes; however,
Zündapp’s resolve was shaken as moving from motorcycles to cars seemed financially
impossible. Porsche shopped the small car around and received considerable interest from
another motorcycle manufacturer NSU; however, a contract with the Italian firm, Fiat, prevented
NSU from expanding into car production.154 In effect, the basic design for the Volkswagen was
completed before Hitler came to power in 1933. The car already has its iconic shape as well as
its novel air cooled engine that was mounted behind the passenger compartment.155 Once Hitler
took up the cause of the Volkswagen it was mostly a process of refining and updating this design
to allow for mass production on an unprecedented scale. There is a prevailing view that Weimar
Germany was racked and ruined by financial crisis that prevented its growth; however, the
development of the small car shows that Germany was on a path, albeit a slow one, to mass
motorization.
Edmund Rumpler’s Tropfen-Auto, Porsche’s Sascha, the Opel Hanomag, the Mercedes
130, the BMW Dixi, , and even Josef Ganz’s Ganz-Klein-Wagen, and indeed Porsche’s Project
12 were all attempts to create a people’s car before 1933.156 The criticism and praise of these
cars created conversations in a wide range of automotive journals and magazines. Koshar
reminds us that there were, “dozens of such magazines… including the Allgemeine Automobil
Zeitung…which appealed to a general audience; the contentious Motor-Kritik, whose editors
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vociferously touted the advantages of small, fast cars… the glossy Motor, which appealed to the
upper-class driving… and the gear heads bible, the Automobiltechnische Zeitschrift. (the
technical automotive newspaper)”157 The list goes on. Explicating the presence of such diverse
sources, Koshar continues,
there is little doubt that German car magazines offered information on the whole
panorama of car culture. Readers could find tips on driving, racing accessories,
service and maintenance, tourist routes, insurance, traffic regulations, and ‘speed
traps,’ coverage of racing events and automobile shows, automotive clothing and
cosmetics, and vacation gear.158
Coupling these developments with the return of the annual auto show in Berlin, they create the
very picture of an automotive nation.
Germany also showed other signs that the car was at the cultural forefront. The first is
the way that motor racing griped the nation. Reiger begins by saying that “The virtually
boundless enthusiasm the car elicited in Weimar Germany manifested itself most visibly among
the mass audiences at the nation’s racetracks.”159 Specifically, he looks at the 1932 German
Grand Prix raced on the AVUS track which attracted by his estimates, “over three hundred
thousand spectators,” some of whom were “unemployed who went hungry to afford a standingroom ticket.”160 The spectacle of these early Grand Prix would still inspire awe today, but
especially for the German public as grand prix racing in this time was dominated by German
heroes like Manfred von Brauchitsch and Rudolf Caraciola. Rieger recounts the coverage of the
1932 German Grand Prix received in the mainstream newspaper Berliner Tageblatt that “the
spectators were richly rewarded with a ‘gigantic struggle’” in that Brauchitsch and Caraciola,
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“‘cased each other’ at ‘terrifying speeds’ in excess of 140 miles per hour.”161 These events
inspired a 1932 film that was centered on Grand Prix racing, Kampf. The story focuses on a love
triangle that embitters two racecar drivers and long time friends, the cheesy story is held together
by thrilling race scenes that were captured at actual grands prix.162
The second sign that mass motorization was already on Germany’s mind involves the
spatial transformation of Germany to accommodate mass motorization by building the
infrastructure including roads, gas stations, and parking garages in anticipation of wider access to
the automobile. Sachs outlines this procession, “the first gasoline pump in Hamburg in 1923, the
first lighted signal lamp in Berlin in 1928, and in 1929 the first parking garage.”163 Sachs goes on
to show how the most necessary transformation was of a “penetrable,” public space: “in the
twenties, the first images of a spatial order defined by traffic started to appear.”164 With these
new roads, clear laws of right of way would come. Hiott notes that during this time “plans were
drawn for a great highway system that would connect Germany and pave the way, literally, for a
new way of thinking about the motor car.”165 Yet, these programs of infrastructure faced
challenges in implementation. The plans for the creation of “Nur-Autostraβen,” (highways for
cars only) were hindered at many levels.166 Given Germany’s limited social diffusion for the
automobile some viewed the roads as streets for the rich. The roads were influenced by special
interest groups and designed by committee. Rivalries emerged in planning over small details like
whether to plant fruit trees or bushes along the roadways. Perhaps most critically, the new
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highways had to compete with more popular proposals to expand the existing network of
roadways.167 Thus, these developments were continually deferred.
C. Production in Weimar
The changes which occurred in the trade unions concerning mechanized labor ultimately
display progress in Germany. As Hiott illustrates, Germans did not strive for the duplication of
the Model T as “too much innovation had happened in the past ten years for Ford’s Model T, the
first People’s car in the world, to serve as anything more than a metaphorical example.”168 The
idea of the automobile animated discussions that transcended production methods. Sach
identifies this linkage in the metal workers’ union newspaper, Metallarbeiter, in 1930. The
author in this article begins by lamenting that high tariffs are stifling Germany’s move toward
mass motorization, which slows economic growth. “The motor vehicle, that fun-filled, purring,
and devilishly fast factory on wheels, has changed our entire public and social life in a few short
decades.”169 The author predicts that, “ the transformation [Fordism] will continue in Europe,
notably in the area of wage policy. This will, in turn, foster and increase in the income of the
masses and their social advance… the revolutionary automobile will serve the cause of the
revolutionary working class.”170 This optimism has to be counterbalanced and explained against
the reality that Germany did not experience a revolution in production and consumption in
Weimar. Instead, what Weimar experienced was growth in production and consumption. Yet,
this growth remained limited by several interconnected factors. First, lending institutions and
executives were not convinced that mass production would result a net gain. Rieger notes that
“businessmen warned that Fordist mass production would undermine German industry’s
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reputation as a purveyor of high quality products.”171 Second, most sectors that made gestures
towards rationalization did so half-heartedly by adopting Taylorist management styles without
the mechanization of production prominent in Fordism.172 Part of this limited move is tied to the
scarcity of capital and the nervousness of businessmen. A third factor is that as wages increased
so too did unemployment. This phenomenon gave credence to some workers’ fears that
rationalization would make many jobs obsolete. Finally, the benefits of improved industry could
not be realized because the German reliance on price fixing kept prices too high and out of the
hands of many workers which defeated the purpose of increased production. To some degree, it
is possible to say that these developments centered around common understandings of how start
industrial rationalization- whether it starts with lower costs as the industrialists believed or if it
started with higher wages as workers tended to propose.173
As for a model of production, except in the case of American controlled Opel, car
manufacturing remained labor intensive. If World War I changed German society into a mass
consumer culture society, as Sachs suggests, surprisingly, it changed very little in terms of how
the automobile was produced.174 Daimler was pushed into adopting mass production methods
during the war for the creation of airplane engines, but after the defeat the company reverted
back to prewar production methods.175 Berghahn indicates that this was largely the result of
entrepreneurs’ and industrialists’ dependence on price fixing set by the cartels which, in these
businessmen’s minds, stabilized the economy and insured profits.176 Notably, Mary Nolan
indicates that the trade unions became receptive of Fordist production methods. She gives the
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example of a trade unionist who visited Ford’s Highland Park facility and remarked, “each
individual worker and each feature of the plant is fitted into the factory whole with planned
expediency…[T]he whole is something organic.”177 Social Democrats were captivated by Ford’s
five-dollar-day program which paid laborers an unheard of wage of five dollars for an eight hour
day.178 Mary Nolan completes this image by saying:
Social Democrats saw high wages and low prices as the prerequisite for
successful Fordism. To be sure, the Fordist wage-and-price policy was in
workers’ self interests, as no movement leader would deny. Ford seemed able to
combine the incompatible by increasing productivity without increasing
exploitation, and by paying workers more for produced goods which cost less.
According to a German worker who had been employed in both the Ruhr and
Detroit, ‘In the current situation it is more pleasant to allow oneself to be
exploited by Ford than by Krupp.’”179
For all the discussion of the American method in this time period, the image of America
was more of a mirage in which Germans saw incommensurable images and responded to
different stimuli. This returns to the problem of the receivers of Americanization that Rob Kroes
describes in his study of European youth culture in the post-war years that, “There is always the
further question as to why, at the level of the individual reception and appropriation of the rival
constructions, people opt for particular readings of their collective identity.”180 Moreover, in the
realm of the automobile, Reiger notes that these visions of modernity which came from the
encounters Nolan describes were not aimed at improving the German automobile industry.
Rieger states, “Germans of the Weimar era looked upon Ford as a mass manufacturer rather than
a car manufacturer,” and that “for German car manufacturers, Fordism remained an elusive goal

177

Nolan, Visions of Modernity, 37.
Flink, The Automobile Age, 120-3.
179
Nolan, Visions of Modernity, 51.
180
Kroes, “American Mass Culture and European Youth Culture,” in Axel Schildt and Detlef
Siegfried eds. Between Marx and Coca-Cola: Youth Cultures in Changing European Societies,
1960-1980 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006) 91.
178

57

as long as the sector was dominated by comparatively small companies unable to shoulder the
investments necessary for mass production.”181
These reasons support Rieger’s conclusions that Germany was far from becoming a
nation on wheels in the Weimar era. Yet the fact that the Weimar Republic was not able to
realize the overly optimistic goals concerning production, or that rationalization did not live up
to the rhetoric of its proponents does not mean that Germany did not have a car culture in the
Weimar era. Car culture flowered with possibility.
D. Conclusion
The concept of the Volkswagen did not come from Hitler, nor exclusively from Porsche,
but from the car culture of the Weimar era. The shifting focus that the literature on Volkswagen
has had in recent years elucidates this point. More attention has been given to the designer and
engineer Josef Ganz, most notably Paul Schilperoord’s monograph, The Extraordinary Life of
Josef Ganz: The Jewish Engineer Behind Hitler’s Volkswagen. Yet, instead of recognizing how
the Volkswagen was a cultural project that circulated throughout Weimar, Schilperoord suggests
that Hitler and Porsche “poached” the concept from Ganz. A similar claim can be made
concerning Hans Ledwinka’s work at the Czech auto manufacturer, Tatra. The visual
similarities between the Beetle and 1934 T77 cannot be denied.182 This made for some
interesting theatre at the patent office as Porsche and Ledwinka attempted to stake a claim for the
basic configuration of the small car. Yet, as any T77 owner will be the first to say, the
Volkswagen Beetle and the Tatra are very different cars. The Tatra has a longer sweeping body,
and although it has the rear mounted and air cooled engine, it is a V-8. Likewise, it has four-
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wheel independent suspension, yet it does not have the torsion bar suspension that allowed
Porsche to give his car secure handling on such a short wheel base.183
The question, “Who invented the Volkswagen?” is much like the question, “Who
invented Jazz?” While many personalities can vie for that honor, it is more of a development of
a particular atmosphere in a particular time and place. Ultimately, neither Ganz nor Ledwinka,
while important to this atmosphere, can claim to have put Germany behind the wheel. In fact,
neither could Porsche and Hitler since their project never actualizes in the Third Reich. The
significant aspect that escapes many authors’ attention, is that despite the financial turmoil of the
1920s, Weimar Germany stood poised to become a nation on wheels. The number of registered
cars in Germany tells part of this tale: in 1924, German streets hosted only 130,000 passenger
vehicles. By 1932, that number swelled to half of a million.184
The Volkswagen was one of many readymade and popular issues that Hitler could seize
upon in his campaign for the hearts and minds of the German public. It was a clear deficiency
that Germans lagged behind their European and importantly their American counterparts which
Hitler diagnosed as a symptom of a larger disease. Economic constraints as well as issues with
production hampered this growth, yet, the demand for the automobile was evident. Weimar
Germany could claim, as Sachs notes, “The people’s car and the freeway – the two pillars of a
society on wheels- had already been conceived of at the beginning of the 1930s, and the ideas
pressed for realization.”185
III. Modernisierungbewältigung des Nationalsozialismus: Coping with Nazi Modernization
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In the 1990s, as the concept of bringing the Beetle back began to circulate in the
boardrooms in Wolfsburg, the idea was met with considerable resistance because the classic
Beetle was “too emotional,” and held too many different meanings.186 In this ambiguous
corporate language, it is not clear what these managers were referencing. Certainly, the nostalgia
of the Beetle’s success in the post-war period, its role as a symbol for counter culture, and its
subsequent image in popular culture had created a hype and mythology about the car that would
be hard to live up to. But as much as it was a reminder of these positive times, Volkswagen’s
managers were probably equally concerned about re-igniting the darker image that the company
had to slay in the 1950s: the car and the factory’s origins in the Third Reich.187
Volkswagen’s management is not the only group to be struck by the task of negotiating
the multidimensional aspect of the historic car. This is what makes the study of the Volkswagen
so viable- its ability to tell many different stories. Yet, with the exceptions of Hans Mommsen
and Manfred Grieger’s inquiry into forced labor in the VW factory and Bernhard Reiger’s recent
contribution, when it comes to the Nazis, the literature has mostly used the Nazis to understand
the Beetle with little attention paid to how the Beetle can give insights into the Nazis. This
disengagement reflects a tendency to shy away from controversies in the larger historiography of
the Third Reich and treat the car as faultless witness to Nazi misconduct.
The issues that historians are forced to deal with when working with the Nazis’
modernization policies, including the construction of the Autobahn and the development of the
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Volkswagen, is that these policies cut both ways. The difficulty arises because the historian is
confronted with definite policies aimed at “progressive” goals but also with the insight and
foreknowledge of the Third Reich’s bloody misdeeds and ruination of Europe. Neil Gregor
cautions historians that work within these parameters in his study of Mercedes-Benz when he
says that
An examination of National Socialism that places those secular trends common to
most European industrial societies at the center of its analysis, however,
necessarily marginalizes those aspects of National Socialism by which the
peculiarity of the regime is defined and wherein its singularity lies (its genocide
policies). The regime’s racist ideology and policy and its imperialist expansionism
– i.e. its core characteristics – are necessarily relativized by an interpretative
framework constructed around ‘modernization.188
The Scylla and Charybdis that historians have to navigate is in acknowledging the material
conditions and daily life in the Third Reich without losing sight of the Holocaust. This issue has
stabilized and has become more commonplace in the last decade with more and more works
looking at the mental structures of Nazism and daily life in the Third Reich. Yet, Gregor’s fears
remain palpable even among such investigatory consensus. Looking broadly at the literature that
focuses on modernization in the Third Reich, a number of strategies emerge to help manage such
risky propositions. First, there has been a tendency to treat Nazi modernization efforts as a part
of a wider propaganda campaign.189 Works in this genre attempt to divide Nazi policy into
rhetoric and action, where common desires of the general public are a Trojan horse for the
genocidal policies of the Nazis. There is some concern with this approach as it relegates the evil

188

Gregor Daimler-Benz in the Third Reich, 3.
Wolfgang König, Volkswagen, Volksempfänger, Volksgemeinschaft: “Volksprodukte” im
Dritten Reich, (Paderborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2004). This division between action
and rhetoric is discussed in Robert Paxton, The Anatomy of Facism, (New York: Vintage Books)
2005; David Welch, “Nazi Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft: Constructing a People’s
Community,” in “Understanding Nazi Germany,” Journal of Contemporary History 39, no. 2
(2004): 213-38.
189

61

of the Third Reich to the high command and the public inherits victim status by being duped into
following Hitler. Intent is a key element to these studies; however, the approach itself does
allow the evolution of policy behind fixed ideas. The second strategy is an ontological approach
which erodes the distinction between rhetoric and program by looking for the interconnectivity
of Nazi Weltanschauung and thereby identifying the sinister in the sanguine. This can be done to
various effects, notably with this approach the contradictions and irrationalities of Nazi thought
and action become more manageable but the common element of assuming cohesiveness
hampers the analysis’ ability to competently handle inconsistencies and evolution in thought and
policy.
The last method for discussing Nazi modernization policy attempts to insulate the study
from the outset by identifying specific parameters that exclude Auschwitz. Yet, the Holocaust is
such a strong feature and interpretative framework for the majority of Modern German
historiography that these authors routinely pay some lip service to the victims of Nazi
modernization. The value of such an approach rests in its ability to relegate some aspects of the
Third Reich as unrelated or unimportant to the genocide program. During the heyday of German
historiography based on Cold War political discourse, the so-called Historikerstreit, a line of
thinking developed around the rationalizing program of the Nazis which sought to understand the
entire development of the Holocaust as an expression of economic rationalization.190 While
theoretically interesting, there is much to be desired in such explanations on empirical and
theoretical grounds as I will discuss below. For the moment, it would suffice to say that studies
on Nazi economics, modernization efforts, and automotive production have disproven the value

190

Ulrich Herbert, “Labour and Extermination: Economic Interest and the Primacy of
Weltanschauung in National Socialism,” Past and Present 138 (1993).
62

of such works, in essence, by saying that economic policy was governed by racist ideology; not
the other way around.191
No single strategy for dealing with Nazi modernizing policy has proved to be a magic
bullet for killing the Nazi legacy in explanation. A mix of these strategies have been employed
on the Volkswagen project, which helps elucidate the Volkswagen’s common use as an example
of more expansive principles in other studies concerning the larger issue of Nazi
modernization.192 However, the cannon of Volkswagen literature has mostly employed the third
strategy of insulation by making the Volkswagen story a redemptive one and penning the Third
Reich as a dark middle chapter, uncritically demonstrating the principle of Stunde Null (ignoring
continuities of post-war Germany and the Third Reich), or otherwise bracketing off the Third
Reich. Taking the two most recent works devoted to Volkswagen, Hiott’s Thinking Small and
Rieger’s The People’s Car, one is struck by this pattern of repression. The Third Reich is clearly
present in Hiott’s work, but except for a few gestures, the time period is dealt with superficially
as her title for part two, “The Darkest Hours come Just before Dawn,” might suggest. This
blurry image of the Third Reich is compounded by the book’s Tarantino-esque structure that
jumps through time and space. Rieger is able to extract much more from the time period by
expanding his analysis to include a new Reich Highway Code in May 1934. This law lessened
regulation and restrictions including speed limits and many right of way laws in hopes that
people would revive chivalry and choose to live selflessly in a Verkehrsgemeinschaft (traffic
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community).193 From that analysis Rieger is able to discover some core elements of Nazi
ideology that help explain significant features of the regime and the car. Yet, Rieger’s emphasis
is likewise in the post-war period which renders his analysis of the Third Reich a touch
impressionistic. In short, Rieger engages the pertinent discussions but does not dwell there long,
meaning there are a few points that can be added to Rieger’s account.
A. Volksgemeinschaft and the Volksprodukte: An Ideology beyond Expense
Bringing all of these threads together, the Volkswagen is highly instructive for
understanding the ambitions and the limits of the Third Reich in the two critical areas of
production and consumption. As for ambitions, the impetus governing the transformation of
both production and consumption stemmed from the bone and sinew of Nazi ideology:
community (Volksgemeinschaft).194 This exclusive view of community gave the Nazi movement
its emotional appeal, instructed its racial programs, and justified the Nazi mandate for war. But
Nazi views of community had limits too. In terms of production, the Volkswagen evidences a
limited resistance to Nazi policy by the established car manufacturers in their reluctance to act
outside of their own interest for the common good.195 Hitler originally charged these
manufacturers with the task of realizing the Volkswagen. In essence, Hitler asked them to put
themselves out of business but they were able to forestall its development for four years until
Hitler moved the program completely under Nazi control.196 The time that they bought here was
more valuable than they could have ever realized, since the Nazi priorities began to shift around
1936 and by 1939 the Volkswagen project was completely consumed by the war. Expanding the
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literature to include works on other car manufacturers, particularly Mercedes-Benz, helps to
indicate the significance of the Third Reich’s motorization policy to the overall program
proposed by Nazism and the ways that it was frustrated and thwarted.
In the present day, it is hard to put the auto industry’s resistance to the regime into
absolute moral terms because it showed that industry had some power to resist the regime, yet,
industry often actively engaged in Holocaust programs; specifically through utilizing forced
labor camps. Yet, using only these two data points does not capture the complexity of the
relationship between industry and the regime.197 The regime had become impatient to industry’s
feet dragging tactics and by 1936 the consequences for further resistance became much more
severe.198 In essence, at least in the automotive world, industry had spent its resistance capital.
Yet, it is important to preserve the complexity and avoid the other absolute oversimplification
that the regime imposed these programs on a reluctant industry. Industry’s compliance to the
directives of the Nazi high command are one of many (albeit an important one) points where
moral consciousness failed to intervene in the wobbly trajectory of the Third Reich.
Moving from production to consumption, the key concept that is often overlooked and
underappreciated in the study of the Volkswagen is how it was part of a larger program of
consumer goods known as Volksprodukte.199 The Volksprodukte were intended to ape American-
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style consumer culture, or at least what Hitler thought he saw in American consumer culture.200
Hitler thought that the Volksprodukte could do specific socialist work for the Reich by eroding
material distinctions between classes, which was something that Hitler admired in American
culture. On Prince Louis Ferdinand’s departure for America, Hitler instructed him to “tell Mr.
Ford… I shall do my best to put his theories into practice in Germany… I have come to the
conclusion that the motorcar, instead of being a class dividing element, can be the instrument for
uniting the different classes, just as it has done in America…”201
Parallel to the frictions between regime and industry, these programs of Volksprodukte
are considered failures at two levels. First, the only successful Volksprodukt (singular) that was
produced was the people’s radio, Volksempfänger. None of the other proposed consumer goods
ever made it past the drafting table. Second, these products were a part of other ideological
programs that impressed Volksgemeinschaft; including the “Strength through Joy” movement,
(Kraft durch Freude) and “Beauty of Work” programs (Schönheit der Arbeit).202 A loose
consensus in historical inquiry has developed that is unconvinced of the power these programs
had in remaking the German public and fundamentally altering their relationships to one
another.203 Even in the warmest embraces of Nazism, older understandings of German society
including class, gender, and confession still governed social interaction. In the few places where
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these products are discussed, these failures somewhat provide their own causal explanation for
why the Volksprodukte failed.204 They never materialized and they had less of an impact on
German social division which was their intention.
Yet, there is a unifying and more explanatory cause for the reasons the Volksprodukte
failed, namely that the Nazis could not control the concept in the public sphere. Consumer
culture marketed goods in the name of Volksprodukte, and this simultaneous development, or
copy-cat production, in the public sector diluted the ideological message. In the two
advertisements from the Berliner Illustrirte Zeitung the concept of Volksprodukte is invoked.
One advertisement for the Ford “Volkswagen” stresses many of its German and community
centered aspects like charity. Counterintuitively, the ad speaks of these cars as being an example
of “Ford quality and German production,” when the two major conceptual currents in German
car culture had been emphasizing Ford production and German quality. Historian of Third Reich
advertising practices Pamela E. Swett notes the close control that Nazi leadership put on the
advertising industry, and this ad may be an example of the push for advertisers to toe the party
line.205 Yet, it appears that Ford Deutschland is doing much more than simply pandering to the
regime’s concept of community and thus has internalized the nationalist and social aspects of
Nazi consumption. But on closer inspection, Ford is perpetuating class divisions by offering an
entry level car “Köln” alongside a more expensive model “Rheinland.” The hope for the
Volkswagen was that if everyone drove the same car then class animosities between worker and
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manger would disappear. In the second advertisement the ideological message of community
through consumption is simply reduced to product affordability.206
In the early days of the new Reich, consumer culture often tried to attach itself to the
popularity of the Nazi movement. Victor Klemperer documented the changing culture of the
Third Reich and notes in his diary on 22 March 1933, “In a pharmacy toothpaste with the
swastika.”207 Whether one takes this mimicry as stemming from opportunistic capitalism or an
overwhelming enthusiasm for the Nazis it does not change the fact that many of these products
miss the point of the Nazi consumption program. Nazi abhorrence of these facsimiles renders
the significance of the Volksprodukte in revealing that they extend beyond the framework of
instrumentality, the only approach that historians have championed with the Volksprodukte, a
view that evaluates these goods solely as a means of propaganda and/or a means to improve
living standards of the German public.208 If that were true, that these goods were mere means to
ends, the replication of these objectives in public spaces would have been embraced as free
advertising for the Nazi regime or seen as evidence of the improved standard of living that
contrasted Weimar scarcity. Yet, Nazi response to the comodification of their ideology could not
have been clearer. In the months following the seizure of power in 1933, Minister of
Propaganda, Josef Goebbels, crafted a law which forbade the use of National Socialist images
and symbols for commercial ends (Gesetz zum Schutz der National Symbole).209 The regime saw
this as a reflected image of how the public understood Nazi modernity, and as such, these
206
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products further muddied the ideological water. When Opel showed Hitler their Volkswagen at
the Berlin Auto Show, an automobile that better fit Hitler’s requirements for a people’s car, he
fumed, “Gentlemen! There can be only one Volkswagen, not ten.”210
This engagement with Nazi ideology bears its weight on how the story of Volkswagen
and the Third Reich inform one another and serves as an important backdrop for any narrative of
Volkswagen in this time. Acknowledging these connections should address Gergor’s concerns
about emphasizing secular trajectories of Nazi modernization policy as it sees them as operating
in the same logic as the extermination camps. This interpretive framework is able to do this by
demonstrating Tooze’s principle, which he deftly cultivates in the pages of Wages of
Destruction: The Making and the Breaking of the Nazi Economy, that Nazi economic policy was
subordinate to cultural policy. The view goes beyond treating popular programs like the
Volksprodukte as discrete elements of propaganda, that is to say, they were the means to more
serious ends. This approach also complicates the nature of cultural power in the Third Reich by
demonstrating the Nazis’ inability to impress certain aspects of certain ideas monolithically onto
its subjects. Furthermore, evaluating the interconnectivity of the Volksprodukte and the ideology
that underpinned them goes a long way to resolving the false dichotomy in Third Reich
historiography that pitted materialist motivations against ideological ones.211 Importantly for this
thesis, this transforms the car from a mere object into a manifestation of a ultranationalist ethos,
which ascribed extraordinary significance to finding and implementing a German mode of
production and consumption. Most of all, it strips away the insulation that usually surrounds the
Volkswagen narrative and integrates Volkswagen more fully into the historiographical
discussion concerning Nazi modernization policy.
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B. The Volkswagen Story
The Volkswagen is an example par excellence of the technological system that Thomas
P. Hughes describes in his essay, “The Evolution of Large Technological Systems,” as it can be
traced in ever widening circles encompassing “physical artifacts,… organizations…
manufacturing firms… regulatory laws [and] natural resources.”212 Yet its fundamental nature is
not technological in the traditional sense, rather the Volkswagen became a part of a system
committed to the cultural production of the Volksgemeinschaft. In many ways the Volkswagen
was the linchpin that would render the varied programs of modernization consistent bridging
work and leisure, technology and the environment, materialism and transcendental spiritualism.
The Volkswagen was integrally connected to transportation network policy (most notability the
autobahn), private organizations like Reich Confederation of the German Auto Industry (RDA),
party organizations like Strength through Joy, the Berlin Auto Show, and environmental
resources and human capital in the form of forced labor. In this way, the technological system to
which the Volkswagen belonged was “both socially constructed and society shaping,” yet it
would never attain the ultimate goals the regime aspired to, which would be the small car’s
saving grace in the post-war era.213
In Weimar, the car for the common man was discussed in public and enthusiast circles,
designed and redesigned but ultimately the plans were always made for some future date. Hitler
wanted to give clear signals to the automotive industry that the time to implement these plans
had come. Eleven days after becoming chancellor, Hitler gave the opening address at the 1933
International Automobile Show in Berlin, his first public address in that capacity. Riding a wave
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of recovery and signs of incremental growth in the automotive industry, Hitler’s intent was to
signal to auto manufacturers in attendance that the time had come to implement these designs
and put Germany behind the wheel.214 The program that year carried the name “The Will to
Motorization.” This is perhaps an example of Mark Mazower’s observation that fascists often
“turn[ed] ‘economic problems’ into ‘questions of will,’ which was another way of saying the
leadership had no idea what to do next.”215 Yet, in this instance, Hitler took the dais with more
than poetic flourishing and oratory fervor, he had a concrete plan to remove the structural
impediments that he believed stifled mass motorization in Weimar Germany. He claimed
I do not wish to neglect the chance of communicating my idea of what must in
[the] future be done for this, perhaps, the most important industry: (1) removal of
state representation of motor vehicle traffic management interests from the
traditional management framework; (2) gradual implementation of tax relief; (3)
commencement and execution of a large-scale plan of street construction; and (4)
support for motor sport events.216
Within the year Hitler made good on each of these four promises, lessening restrictions for
obtaining a driving license, transforming traffic laws, cutting taxes on registering vehicles,
breaking ground on a national highway system and funding two German Grand Prix racing
teams, Mercedes-Benz and Auto Union, which were so dominant that the two teams only real
form of competition was one another.217
In 1933 Hitler never referenced the creation of a Volkswagen; instead he took a more
traditional understanding of the relationship between his regime and the automotive industry.
Yet, the next year Hitler spoke again at the opening of the Berlin Auto Show, as he would
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continue to do until the outbreak of war, advocating the development of a small car for the
people.218 Despite all of this interest in everything automotive-- such as appeals to the public
and the industry to move toward mass motorization, the pageantry of the automobile shows, the
constant interventions that the regime imposed on the automotive industry, and the endless heaps
of liquid capital injected into motorization projects (the Nazi regime spent over 100 million
Reichmarks on the development of the Volkswagen and the Volkswagen factory alone)-- in
1939 Germany’s automotive trajectory was moving further away from mass participation in an
automotive society with few indications that these trends could be reversed.219
Traditional economic analysis falls short of making pecuniary dispensations in the Third
Reich intelligible except in unfolding its spectacular failures. Nazi economic policy was a
witches’ brew of autarkic policy, rearmament directives, industrial interventionism, and
equivocatory consumerist aspirations.220 This mix of goals and objectives were further
complicated by a Manichean rhetoric that eschewed economic motivations and understanding for
a world view based on raising cultural standards which were inherently at odds with materialist
economics.221 Hitler repeatedly contrasted economic concerns by characterizing them as foreign,
Jewish, and dangerous. Hitler made this a common theme in Mein Kampf and maintained that
man “will die for an ideal” but “man does not sacrifice himself for material interests.” 222 To
consider economics first was, therefore, not only naive but also dangerous because it created
competition turning the Volk on one another and the true strength of the state rested in its ability
218

Grosse-Boerger, “Racing and the Motorization of the German People,” 34.
Wolfgang König, “Adolf Hitler vs. Henry Ford: The Volkswagen, the Role of America as a
Model, and the Failure of a Nazi Consumer Society,” German Studies Review 27 no. 2 (2004):
258-60.
220
Mazower, Dark Continent, 126-37; Tooze, Wages of Destruction¸659; König, “Hitler v.s.
Ford,” 260.
221
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, (1939: repr., Boring, Oregon: CPA Book Publisher, 2000) 94.
222
Ibid.
219

72

to cultivate, “the capacity and readiness to sacrifice the individual to the common welfare.”223
Hitler believed that economic interests must be subordinate to the cultural interests of the state.
High trade deficits, protectionist tariffs, and campaigns of moral coercion to buy domestic
products all worked to undermine Germany’s reliability as an international partner.224 Wages
were kept depressed in an effort to make rearmament viable while a handful of critical consumer
goods were promised and dangled just out of reach of workers and the lower middle class.225
Yet it very much was an economic issue that prevented mass motorization in the
transition from late Weimar to the Third Reich, as the only people who were willing to invest in
Germany’s automotive future, it seemed, were Ford and General Motors. This trend away from
mass motorization seems to be epitomized by Porsche’s failure to create a small car with
Zündapp and NSU. After the small car project fell through with Zündapp and NSU, Porsche’s
firm turned its attention to developing a Grand Prix car for the newly formed Auto Union in late
1932. While Auto Union was a new entity, it was composed of four small established car
manufacturers that had banded together in order to survive; Horch, Wanderer, DKW
(Zschopauer Motorenwerke) and Audi. The timing of this change in priorities must have seemed
fortuitous, as months later the new Chancellor of Germany promised to support motor racing in
order to raise German prestige.226 In March of 1933 Porsche and the board of Auto Union met
with Hitler to attempt to secure financial provisions for Porsche’s race car. Accounts of this
meeting make special note of the convincing it took for Hitler to endorse a second racing team
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after “his beloved” Mercedes-Benz team which received significant financial backing from the
government.227
Initially, Hitler met the request with indignation that was only softened by Porsche’s long
soliloquy of the technical details of the car.228 Hiott explains Hitler’s reluctance to the proposal
through his enduring fondness of Daimler-Benz.229 Hopfinger highlights that Hitler did not see
the necessity of two German teams for winning worldwide prestige.230 Yet, in light of the
ubiquitous push for instilling an undivided sense of community, i.e. Volksgemeinschaft, the
source of Hitler’s reluctance may have been more ideological than practical. Grand Prix racing
was meant to foster a sense of German pride and, therefore, be a cohesive and unifying project,
having two German teams could result in factionalism with fans identifying first with specific
brands and only secondly with the national dimension of the teams. An article in Der Motorist
covering the 1935 Berlin Auto Show suggests this push for corporate unity declaring, “This is no
longer a matter of industrial companies fighting for supremacy, but of the German automobile
and motorcycle industry firmly uniting to fight for our national prestige and the national success
of a wonderful cause.”231 This statement was the official line and more wishful thinking than
reality. Whatever hang-ups Hitler had with Auto-Union’s proposal, Porsche was able to
persuade Hitler to commit to sponsoring the construction of four racing cars giving Auto-Union
one-third of the funds earmarked for the Benz team.232
In the following autumn, Porsche received an invitation to meet with Jakob Werlin, who
Porsche knew as a director in the Daimler-Benz company. A personal friend to Hitler even
227
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before the Nazis came to power, Werlin served in an advisory role to Hitler in matters regarding
motorization.233 At the meeting, the two were joined by Hitler who broached the subject of
creating a small car for the people. One of the most discussed elements in the history of the
Volkswagen was the degree of influence Hitler ultimately had on the technical details of the
Volkswagen. The Nazis engaged in a program to forge links between Hitler’s name and the
Volkswagen, presenting it as solely Hitler’s idea. As Wolfgang König suggests, this branding
campaign was not aimed at taking credit away from Porsche for the concept and design of the
Volkswagen as much as it was aimed at decoupling the concept of a people’s car from Henry
Ford and America.234 Rieger suggests that Porsche’s ideas prevailed and the cocktail napkin
Hitler doodled on during Porsche and Hitler’s meeting was ultimately disregarded. There is
much to suggest this point of view, particularly in light of the similarities between the finalized
version and the prototypes Porsche created for the two motorcycle firms before Hitler came to
power. Hitler’s main issue was engine placement, the rear mounted engine seemed too
unorthodox but ultimately this was not the most important aspect of the car.235 Others, including
Hopfinger, note that while Porsche and Hitler were able to see eye to eye on many aspects of the
small car they could not see past Hitler’s demand that the car be sold to the public for less than
1000 RM which seemed impossible to Porsche, as in fact, it was impossible.236
The failure of the entire project can be traced to Hitler’s insistence on the price of 1000
RM. In some ways the insistence of such an outrageous price was reminiscent of Henry Ford’s
business ideals that he laid out in his autobiography. One pillar of Ford’s corporate philosophy
was “the profit motive,” which Ford described as “nam[ing] a price so low as to force everybody
233
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[to] dig for profits.”237 But importantly there was the realization that there would be no profit in
the traditional sense, in fact, the cars that the regime planned to sale would be subsidized with
the government talking on over half of the cost of production.238 König believes that this
outrageous price came from earlier discussions in committees dedicated to investigating mass
motorization in the Third Reich. There were two general ideas that were floated in these
meetings: the small-car, like the Volkswagen, and the mini-car which was a three wheeled
vehicle powered by a motorcycle engine (like the BMW Isetta produced after the war). It was
agreed in these meetings that the mini-car could be produced (not sold) for 1000 RM, and
somehow when the proposal for the mini-car was abandoned the price of 1000 RM was applied
to the small car.239
Equally likely, the price came from the realization that income levels for workers, the
target demographic of such a car, were far too low to suggest a higher price point. The reality
was, however, even 1000 RM was to be too expensive for the majority of workers in the Third
Reich. This moment of insensitivity to the realities and possibilities of productions and the
disregard of needs for consumption points to the larger contradictions in Nazi priorities, wages
were kept too low to create an American style consumer culture in order to make rearmament
viable. Yet as the Nazi programs to raise the standard of living failed, the Nazi high command
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interpreted these failures as proof of international Jewish sabotage and inadequate Lebensraum,
requiring heavier investment in rearmament.240
While the degree of influence Hitler had on the design of the Volkswagen is contested,
Hiott goes one step further to note that Hitler was merely parroting Porsche’s ideas as his own.241
After a long meeting, Werlin asked Porsche to create a memorandum that would outline the
particular features of such a car, which Porsche did in a short memorandum known as the
Porsche Exposé dated 17 January 1934. The Porsche Exposé was a sober account that works
through the technical aspects of the car design. The design was a compromised version of the
cars Porsche was unable to produce with the motorcycle manufacturer NSU in 1932.242 Porsche
begins his report by acknowledging the need and the feasibility of creating a Volkswagen. His
introduction looks to the success of the Volksempfänger, or people’s radio, as a precedent for
undertaking such an endeavor.243 The central concern of this document is ensuring that the
Volkswagen does not become compromised to fit a price point. Porsche states:
I do not see a small vehicle with artificially restricted dimensions, performance
and weight, etc., in the manner in which we have seen some results in this area.
Such a car can be cheap to purchase, but never from the point of view of a healthy
national economy, since the value is extremely limited if the driving comfort of
life are in any way decreased. At such times of an increase of traffic density,
when the safety of the vehicle is gaining more importance, all measures which in
any way lower the value of the vehicle are to be totally rejected.244
Porsche showcases his diplomatic prowess in this introduction by using Hitler’s own vernacular
to reframe the car in terms of a “healthy national economy,” and by citing the people’s radio and
the success of the creation of the Autobahn. The report continues by listing the five necessities
240
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of a true Volkswagen, emphasizing its “road-holding” capabilities, a top speed of 100kph (62
mph), a “mountain-climbing ability of about 30%,” the ability to carry four passengers, and “the
lowest possible purchase price and lowest possible running costs.”245 Yet, on the issue of price,
Porsche remains obstinate, claiming, “with the future of Volkswagen, there may be no
compromise solution in consideration of a certain price.”246 Porsche goes on to say that he can
design such a car and as for payment he is content with a licensing fee if the car goes into
production.247
At the surface level there is nothing transformative about Porsche’s short memorandum.
The technical specifications and design concepts all fit within the patterns forged in the
Volkswagen craze of the 1920s. Yet while the technical features did not change, the contexts
that Porsche used demonstrate the fundamental shift away from the aspirations of private
consumption in Weimar to one firmly fixed into the program of Nazi modernity. The question of
the Volkswagen is transformed into a question of the nation and class unity. Porsche points to
the failures of the private industry to overcome class exclusion and references its importance, not
as a product to be consumed by individuals but for the German nation. Porsche notes how
government planning can expedite the production of such a good. As innocuous as using the
Volksempfänger as a model may seem, the implication would be that the Volkswagen would be
produced in the same way. Under the direction of Joseph Goebbels all of the radio
manufacturers were conscripted to produce a single design of an inexpensive radio.248 While in
the short term it helped to stimulate growth in the sector, that growth would be terminal as the

245

Ibid.
Ibid.
247
Ibid.
248
König, “Ford vs. Hitler,” 252.
246

78

market became saturated with the same standard product.249 Yet, Porsche was being more
diplomatic than ideological in relating his project to Hitler’s goals. It was, after all, a sales pitch
with a multi-point conclusion stating why he should be entrusted with the design contract.
Nevertheless, the Nazis were transforming the very foundation of Germany’s car culture.
Earlier associations and value systems were systematically eroded and the car question was
reframed as an industrial and national question. The entire atmosphere of the 1934 Berlin Auto
Show was transformed. In 1934 Hitler exchanged his civilian suit for his military uniform.
Likewise, the swastika flags replaced the international flags that usually adorned the convention
hall and the seats traditionally reserved for foreign dignitaries were now reserved for officers in
the SS. The texture of this transformation is most visible in the event posters for the 1934 Berlin
Auto Show. In 1933, the poster featured a young couple framed by the windshield of an
automobile highlighting the post-sale consumption of the automobile.250
The 1934 poster, on the other hand, appears almost intentionally sinister. Julia GrosseBoerger notes that the image “shows how the National Socialist were making a grab for the car
and the automotive industry.”251 The bare chassis of a car is held up by the swastika banded arm
extended above a barren industrial valley wasteland. Stripped of its defining characteristics, the
coachworks, the car is inelegant, incomplete, and even crude. Even the line weight of the text
completes the transformation from a light script to heavy font. Compared to the previous year’s
poster, the Nazi image indicates struggle through unity and determination, and, in essence, that
motorizing Germany would be no Sunday drive. This was the imagery that Hitler used to
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introduce the Volkswagen, and this industrial image of a Volkswagen would guide Hitler’s
policies that would yield the motorization of Germany. To achieve this goal policies had to be
implemented to cure the diseases within the German auto industry.
If industry was central to the new image of car culture in Germany, the individual
automotive firms did not completely buy into this picture and continued to advertise as
individual concerns with their own distinct appeal to individual consumers.252 Additionally, the
good will that Hitler earned with the established car manufacturers for his four point plan to
motorize Germany in 1933 began to deteriorate in the following year. Hitler made appeals to the
industry as a whole through the automotive lobby, the Reich Confederation of the German Auto
Industry (Reichsverband der Automobilindustrie or RDA). At the same time Hitler was
interviewing Porsche, he had also reached out to the RDA for suggestions on how to create a
Volkswagen. The RDA proposed a number of half-hearted measures that were similar to the
1933 measures including more tax credits and industrial subsidies. More alarming for Hitler was
the back biting of the individual firms who each proposed their own designs and plans to create a
Volkswagen in the private sector. Opel believed that they were the only ones capable of such a
manufacturing feat, but their early celebrations in their newsletter raised the ire of Hitler who
was already resentful about Opel’s GM ownership.253
Perhaps because of this disharmony, Hitler opted to ignore all of the lobby’s suggestions,
including their dissatisfaction with Porsche’s proposal. In July of 1934 Hitler announced that
Porsche’s design firm would be the one responsible for "the motorization of the German people
on the basis of teamwork, using the best strengths of the German automotive body
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[Automobilwesen], by all means to promote the interests of the German Reich."254 Clear in
Hitler’s statements was not only Porsche’s role in creating the Volkswagen, but also the role that
German automotive concerns would play as well. Hitler was positioning the industry to repeat
the Volksempfänger’s successes based on mass production on a massive scale. But the
manufacture of a car is far different from the manufacture of a radio. The capital required for
rationalization of a radio factory pales in comparison to that of the automobile. First, the car has
many more types of tasks associated with its construction: engine building, body work shaping,
electrical wiring, glass work, and upholstery. All of these more or less independent workshops
have to be configured as to produce at the same level, so that engines, coachworks, and
upholstery are able to be assembled simultaneously.
Furthermore, there were 28 radio manufacturers in Germany all of whom participated in
the creation of the Volksempfänger compared to the 10 surviving German car manufacturers.
The real issue was the amount of diversity that existed in the German automotive industry. Of
these ten, two were American subsidiaries (Ford Deutschland and Opel) and four more had
banded together under the Auto Union corporate structure, ostensibly making it a single concern.
The remaining four automotive concerns ran the gambit from principally motorcycle
manufacturers like BMW to manufacturers that made hand-produced, high end luxury cars like
Maybach. Daimler-Benz stood alone as a truly German company that had experience with mass
production techniques, but the Mercedes brand could never make a serious grab at the lower end
of the market, favoring the higher profits per unit of upper and mid-class cars.255 Benz’s market
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share had the effected its production methods as the expensive cars relied on a discerning skilled
labor force. With the largest rationalized factory on the continent, Opel would have been the
clear choice to produce the Volkswagen; however, Opel had its own Volkswagen, the P4, the
mandate to produce Porsche’s design and sell it at Hitler’s price of 990RM made the
Volkswagen a losing endeavor.256 This is perhaps the most important difference between the
Volksempfänger and the Volkswagen: radio manufacturers endorsed the Volksempfänger as
profits were still manageable in most cases while there would be no profit margins at all at the
price point on which Hitler was insisting.257
Compounding the RDA’s woes was Hitler’s personal involvement. The motorcar was
one of Hitler’s lifetime fascinations and he believed that it was the defining symbol of progress
in the 20th Century. At the groundbreaking ceremony for the autobahn in 1933, Hitler noted that,
“If in earlier times one attempted to measure people’s relative standard of living according to
kilometers of railway track, in the future one will have to plot the kilometers of streets suited to
motor traffic.”258 Perhaps this sense of prestige associated with the automobile was the reason
that Hitler was willing to bankrupt his party by buying a new Mercedes in 1924 after his failed
Beer Hall Putsch.259 Hitler created his own mythologies around his dedication to motorizing
Germany spinning a tale of rescuing a stranded motorcyclist in his Mercedes before he came to
power. This was an apocryphal moment when Hitler realized that the German people deserved
the dignity of owning their own car which made motorization a priority.260 As the RDA and
Porsche knew all too well, motorizing Germany was Hitler’s project, and Hitler was all too

256

Turner, General Motors and the Nazis, 32-4.
Wolfgang König, Volkswagen, Volksempfänger, Volksgemeinschaft ,224.
258
Hitler in Hiott, Thinking Small, 105.
259
Hopfinger, The Volkswagen Story, 67.
260
Hiott, Thinking Small, 109.
257

82

willing to take credit for the successes of the recovering auto industry. The RDA agreed to work
on the Volkswagen project in order to control its direction and avoid having the regime impose
solutions. Unable to contradict Hitler, the RDA implemented stall tactics and sabotage by
imposing unrealistic deadlines and constantly second guessing Porsche’s design and progress.
Even as Porsche presented three functioning prototypes in 1936, RDA had the advantage of
reality on its side since it could always point to the impossible price that Hitler had already made
public at the 1935 Berlin Auto Show.261 Yet, the constant loggerheads of the RDA just further
eroded the ground that the organization was founded upon, and Werlin, Porsche, and Hitler
would increasingly bypass and exclude the RDA from the Volkswagen conversation.262
Had Hitler been content to being the symbolic figurehead of German motorization, the
Volkswagen story would have a much different plot. Yet, German automotive manufacturers
were obliged to acquiesce to Hitler’s understanding of industry and methods of production. Yet,
everything that Hitler knew about production came from Henry Ford’s autobiography My Life
and Work; a folksy ghostwritten puff piece, hardly a text book on practical production methods.
Hitler’s admiration of Henry Ford has developed enough interest to generate its own substantial
body of work.263 Hiott discusses how Hitler read My Life and Work while in prison after the
Beer Hall Putsch, and that Hitler kept a life-sized portrait of Ford in his office.264 Once he came
to power Hitler would give away copies of Fords books, both My Life and Work, and the
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collection of anti-Semitic diatribes compiled in Ford’s book The International Jew.265 In July of
1938, Ford received the ‘Grand Cross of the Supreme Order of the German Eagle,’ the “highest
honor the Reich could then bestow upon a foreigner.”266 Karl Heinz Roth attempted to find
similarities between German administration policies and the Fordist model of production,
however, Roth’s work has been called into question for over-emphasizing the control of the
regime and the willingness of industry to participate in Hitler’s visions. Wolfgang König
explores the limits of Hitler’s admiration for Ford which can be divided between Ford the
company and Ford the man. In line with his autarkic preferences, in a secret order in 1936 Hitler
prohibited party officials from buying Ford cars.267 König uses Ford to explore the ways the
image of America influenced the creation of the Volkswagen, in particular the concerted effort to
re-associate the concept of mass motorization away from Ford and America to Hitler and
Germany.268
The Volkswagen was intended to incorporate important aspects of Fordism. Much like
the Model T that motorized America, the Volkswagen was to be the single model produced in a
factory configured with single purpose machines that would efficiently produce the car in a high
enough volume to lower costs but retain a small profit margin. Like the Model T, the
Volkswagen would be offered in a single color, but instead of black like the early Fords, the
Volkswagen would be a grayish blue. Finding Fordist tendencies in production culture is one
thing, distilling it as an ideology and tracing it back through policy is a far greater task. Ford’s
treatment of factory workers, the so called “welfare capitalism,” has some definite parallels with
incentives the Nazi regime imposed, particularly the Beauty of Work program that improved
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working conditions by focusing on improving hygiene and safety. Yet, perhaps the best known
of Ford’s policies never materialized in Nazi Germany: the importance of paying a competitive
wage to ensure retention and to pull the worker up into the consumer class.
Yet while Hitler was stuck on Fordism and pre-World War I patterns of production and
consumption, the German automotive industry had moved on. Auto manufacturers in Weimar
and the Third Reich are often presented as being anachronistic or at least out of sync by favoring
more flexible forms of production compared to mass production and Fordism. In reality, this
was the way the wind was blowing even in the land of Fordism; America. Ford himself had to
come to terms with the rise of General Motors which he convinced himself that it was ultimately
due to people being “tired of seeing” the old Model T.269 This is obviously an over
simplification that does not account for the competitive nature of automobile industry. General
Motors soon supplanted Ford as the largest producer of car in the United States at the end of the
1920s. GM’s president, chairman and CEO Alford P. Sloan introduced an alternative to Ford’s
single model by developing a line of cars, entry, mid-sized, and luxury with the hope of building
customer loyalty and moving them up the line.270 Infamously, Sloan is credited with the
pioneering of planned obsolescence, which fits with his general notions of production and
consumer markets.271 Customers who could afford a new car every few years needed a
convincing reason to turn in their used car, and so, models too would be updated annually,
allowing the new models to generate their own need in the cultural economy.272 To ensure
profits innovations would be introduced to both the car and the production process, where the
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early developments of a model would focus on the car itself and then the focus would shift to the
production process.273 It is not surprising that is development was disregarded by Hitler, because
it put class divisions on prominent display in the car culture. Some German automobile firms
were attempting to bypass the Fordist mass production phase seeing realizing that mass
production contains its own seeds of destruction. At the end of the Weimar Republic and
beginning of the Third Reich, Daimler-Benz appears to be incorporating this strategy by
expanding to a three car line including the “economic” Mercedes 130. Gregor’s research also
suggests Benz’s adoption of Sloanism by showing the company’s reluctance to reform their
factories in such a way that would prevent the periodic update of models.274
C. From the RDA to the DAF: A “Watershed Moment” in the History of the
Volkswagen275
The frustrations that the regime faced with the automotive industry were mirrored in
other industries as well. This is most evident in the 1936 memorandum Hitler created
introducing the Four Year Plan. The memo targeted Hjalmar Schacht’s frustrated attempts to
structure the national economy for rearmament and bring big business onboard to increase output
and prepare for war. Heavy industry was charged with finding solutions to inefficiency through
rationalization and standardization, yet much like the RDA and the Volkswagen episode,
industry found ways to resist and delay these measures. Hitler’s memo is perhaps most infamous
for its reference of finding a “final solution,” which directly tied economic survival to state
endorsed genocide. The memo begins by listing the difficulties that the regime had endured in
attempting to force standardization and rationalization. Hitler exclaims:
273
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It is not a matter of discussing whether we are to wait any longer… it is not the
job…of government to rack…[its] brains over methods of production… either we
possess today a private industry, in which case its job is to rack its brains about
methods of production; or we believe that it is the government’s job to determine
methods of production, and in that case we have no further need of private
industry…276
At this point in the memorandum, Hitler turns his attention to what he perceived to be the cause
of this particular failing, maintaining that industry was willfully resisting standardization in an
attempt to “possess… certain reserves abroad, which are thus withheld from the grasp of the
domestic economy,” an action which prompted Hitler to propose “A law making the whole of
Jewry liable for all damage inflicted upon the German economy by individual specimens of this
community of criminals.”277
The RDA’s principle task was the creation of the Volkswagen while other organizations
negotiated other policy considerations between industry and the regime. In 1936 as the RDA’s
influence declined, Hitler and Göring increasingly turned to the WiGruFa, or Wirtschaftsgruppe
Fahrzeugindustrie (Economic Group for the Automotive Industry), another collection of
representatives from all of the automobile manufacturers which was founded in 1934.278 This
committee was meant to handle the transition to wartime production by creating policies that
would raise productivity and facilitate the rationing of raw materials. Getting the Volkswagen
project to its current state in 1936 had taken much longer than Hitler imagined, and the problem
of how to produce and distribute the Volkswagen had not been solved. As per Hitler’s request,
Economic Minister, Colonel von Schell, oversaw an imposed reduction in the models produced
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by German automotive firms, moving the entire sector closer towards Ford’s single model
production.279
Neither Hitler nor von Schell could be bothered with the details of how to implement
these measures and therefore, it was left up to the collection of firms represented in the
WiGruFa, which resulted in infighting to protect individual firms’ interests. On the face of it, the
imposed reduction of models appeared to work as large and small firms alike committed to
building fewer designs. Yet, all of the designs that were cut from production were small cheap
cars in the lower end of the market; a prudent business decision to avoid competition with the
future Volkswagen.280 Already, in 1936, the specter of the Volkswagen was being felt as
demand for small cars dried up in anticipation of the Führer’s economic supercar.281 Industry
was willing to commit to this new market focus despite the finality of dropping models as the
introduction of new models had to be approved by the regime. The other important measure was
von Schell’s literal retooling of the industry. Redesigns and updates were common for the
consumer market and to facilitate these, Daimler-Benz preferred multi-purpose tools that could
be reconfigured to create new models.282 Yet, the utility of redesigns was deemed subordinate to
efficiency for a wartime Germany. Despite some reluctance, von Schell could claim some minor
victories, Gregor’s research indicates that the government’s insistence paired with a shrinking
pool of skilled labor encouraged Daimler-Benz to adopt more automated machinery.
Yet while there was a push for rationalization, the issue of improving efficiency was
hamstrung by the rationing measures the regime simultaneously imposed. For the years 1936
and 1937 there was a backlog of orders for passenger cars at Daimler-Benz; however, this had
279
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little to do with growing demand. Tires were distributed to automotive factories at a rate that
would keep production going four days a week, likewise, iron and steel would be reduced
annually by one quarter. The primacy of the military’s use of resources combined with the
depressed wages for workers are the two primary reasons that historians cite when evaluating the
meager consumer culture of the Third Reich. Sometimes this explanation is seasoned with
references to the Nazis’ anti-materialist, backwards-looking ideology.283 Adam Tooze’s
interpretation is particularly unique in that he sees no distinction between the two programs of
military expansion and consumer culture held together with a deeply materialist ideology
committed to raising the standard of living.284
Saddled with the imposed transformations and restrictions coming through the WiGruFa,
car manufacturers could no longer entertain the Volkswagen fantasy. In 1936 BMW’s General
Director Franz Popp suggested a plan to the RDA and the regime that the state could build the
car in a new factory that could handle the high volume needed to recoup costs.285 Popp went as
far as to suggest that it could be rolled into Robert Ley’s organization, the Deutsche Arbeitsfront
(DAF), which replaced all other forms of worker representation including labor unions in Nazi
Germany.286 The DAF’s main programs at this time were the Kraft-durch-Freude (KdF) or
Strength through Joy projects which offered middle class leisure activities like vacations and
modest improvements in working conditions. In reality, the Nazi government was already
moving the project in this direction independently of the existing automotive concerns. Before
Popp proposed relinquishing the RDA’s control of the Volkswagen project, Porsche made two
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trips to the United States to observe mass production techniques. Porsche made his first trip in
1936 with the Auto Union race team but remained in the United States for four weeks. Porsche
found many German emigrants who had come to the United States in the inter-war period to
work for Ford. Later in the year, Porsche returned to the United States with the authority to
extend contracts to specialists in mass production to come to Germany and work on the
Volkswagen production lines. Porsche collected some twenty such contracts.287
Robert Ley was all too happy to accept the responsibility of making Hitler’s vision a
reality. The DAF confiscated the coffers of all of the trade unions that the organization replaced
in the Machtergreifung and continued to collect dues from workers to fund the DAF’s various
projects.288 Such an endowment meant that DAF could fund the project without additional state
support, making the DAF an obvious choice for the project from a financial standpoint. The
DAF was first proposed in November of 1933 and after successful negotiations concerning the
structure and purview of the organization, which gave the majority of power to individual
employers, the DAF became codified in the January 1934 law Gesetz zur Ordnung der
nationalen Arbeit (National Labor Law).289
KdF evolved from a precursor, After Work, which Robert Ley lifted from Italian
fascism’s successful leisure program Dopolavoro, literally “After Work.”290 After Work
entertainment programs were marginally popular with workers, although Ley felt that After
Work had fatal short comings. First, the program was exclusively for the worker which
emphasized the worker/employer rift that Ley ultimately hoped to bridge. Second, After Work
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was limited to precisely that the hours away from the shop floor.291 Ley began working on a new
organization that matched his ambitions, creating the Strength through Joy organization that
could promote cultural activities, community, and improve the aesthetic and hygiene of working
conditions. While the KdF was diverse in its offices and its programs, far and away the crown
jewel of the organization was the Office for Travel, Hiking, and Vacationing, which was able to
carry on largely un-effected by the rearmament rush of the Four Year Plan.292
Unlike the RDA, Ley intended to sell Volkswagens and identified three main obstacles to
the Volkswagen’s success. First was the problem of creating a factory that could produce the
Volkswagen in sufficient numbers to offset the cost of production. Porsche was in a position to
manage the necessary technological features of the factory; however, finding a place to construct
the factory and handling all of the necessities beyond the shop floor was beyond his expertise.
Hopfinger’s account of Porsche’s extended obligations to the Volkswagen project paints a
picture of reluctance, insisting that Porsche was hesitant to anything beyond designing the car.293
Quite opposite to this, Rieger’s account notes how Porsche took the initiative, wanting to remain
as involved as possible in the production of the car.294 This exposes one of the main weaknesses
with Hopfinger’s narrative, which is undoubtedly a cornerstone for subsequent research on
Volkswagen. Hopfinger’s work was based on oral interviews in the late 1950s, when many were
still trying to disavow collaboration and participation in Nazi programs and, in general, distance
themselves from the Nazi nightmare. Rieger’s use of archival material seems to produce a less
biased account, and it seems likely that Porsche would want to protect his vested interest in
seeing the car put into production since he had negotiated payment based on a licensing fee. The
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more cars that the factory could produce, the more money Porsche would stand to gain, so his
involvement in the factory design was an investment on future returns.
The second issue Ley recognized was the problem of distribution. Had the automotive
industry brought the project to completion, the Volkswagen could have been sold through the
existing distribution networks that the auto-firm already had in place. Yet, the RDA had made
the industry seem too untrustworthy to handle the sale of Hitler’s cars. Moreover, Ley more
often than not preferred to use his own organization to handle such matters and thereby retain
complete control of the entire process. Ley’s solution was to pass the distribution responsibility
on to the customer, who would have to venture to the factory to pick up his or her new car.295 As
a byproduct, this scheme had built in propagandistic potential as the customer could tour the
factory floor and see the involved processes that go into making such a car. Such a journey
could be highly ritualistic and laden with symbolic content: traveling by train into the factory
city and leaving a member of the Verkerhsgemeinschaft (traffic community) would be a highly
emotional event akin to an initiation. At the very least this would present the opportunity to
forge firmer links in the association of the automobile and the motorization of Germany and the
personality of Hitler.
The third obstacle, perhaps the most significant of the three obstacles, was the fact that
even at the 990RM price tag, most German workers could not gather 1000RM as disposable
income. König believes this exemplifies the Nazi’s failure to create a consumer culture, namely
they “focused on mass production and neglected the prerequisites of a mass market.”296 Ley’s
office sought to overcome this by creating a savings program (Sparkarte or savings card) where
subscribers would pay 5RM a week for four years. Each week that subscribers paid they would
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receive a stamp which would go on into a booklet, once the booklet was complete it could be
redeemed for a car. Through the Sparkarte scheme over 300,000 KdF-Wagens were presold.
Mostly this figure has been used to demonstrate the success of Ley’s venture and product hungry
Germany of the late 1930s. Yet this number does not tell the entire story. As König details the
demographics, the intended market for the small car was clearly missed: “more than 40 percent
came from the commercial establishment. They wanted to increase their car fleets with the
Volkswagen. 29 percent were employees, 17 percent public servants, and only 5 percent were
workers.”297 Moreover, measured against the regime’s own ambitions 300,000 seemed paltry,
the factory was designed to be developed in three stages that would roughly produce 500,000
units a year each. Thus, even the first stage would have been able to produce more than 300,000
units in the first year. Ultimately, the production capacity would dwarf that figure. The number
that Hitler repeated year after year starting in 1937 was 1.5 million cars per annum; more
conservative estimates place the figure closer to 1 million.298
While in speeches Hitler emphasized such production numbers as a cultural triumph of
German superiority, producing the high volume of Volkswagens was critical to recoup the costs
of production.299 The regime could not deny that they were looking at taking a loss of almost
1000RM per unit produced. Hitler and his advisors wrote off these losses with vague references
to new forms of rationalization that would make the car profitable.300 By the time Hitler took the
platform in Wolfsburg for the Volkswagen Werk, 350 Million Reich Marks were raised and set
aside for the building of the factory.301 With the factory running at full tilt, the optimum plan for
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the small car, for which no one could account for the practical features, had a profit margin of
100RM per unit. At that rate, 3.5 million units would have to be sold before the first signs of
profit would be seen. It would take nearly eight years of break-neck production just to recoup
the initial investment.302 Yet, even if this production miracle was achievable, it would also
require a miracle in the realm of sales. In 1936 the Berlin Institute of Business Research found
that the demand in the car market would cap at around 1.6 million for all of Germany.303 This
suggests another connection to Tooze’s argument about a war of expansion being central to the
Nazi economy, for the Volkswagen to ever work it would need a larger market.
Yet even as Ley’s office was re-imagining the social and cultural life of the Volkswagen,
they were also busy making the necessary preparations to ensure the production of the car.
Envisioning the new factory city was difficult and had many constraints. It had to be near a rail
line or canal for raw materials to be brought in, and it also needed to be near one of the newly
planned autobahn highways so that customers could accept deliver of their cars. Geographically,
it needed to be constructed on flat lands and some concerns were expressed over its defendability
from aerial raids during war, which also needed to be considered. Most of all, it needed to be
big. The original proposal looked to appropriate 20 square miles which would be used to
construct the largest automotive factory in Europe as well as housing for the 90,000 people who
would work and live in the new city.304 Adding the factory to an already established city was not
considered for a few reasons. First, such a large factory would pull workers from other
industries of importance for the Reich at a time when unemployment figures were in the
negatives and Germany was importing workers from Italy. The designers and Nazi functionaries
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believed that by building the city in an undeveloped area, workers would be pulled more evenly
from across Germany. Second, the new factory city was meant to serve as a model of Nazi
modernity, not just for the product that it created, the Volkswagen, but also through the
organization and creation of the factory and the city. 305 The hope was to offer an alternative
utopian vision of progress and productivity that could contrast and dwarf the factories of
capitalism.
Ley delegated the job of finding a location to his second in command, Dr. Bodo
Lafferentz, who, after an exhaustive search, selected an area near Schloss Fallersleben, a 14th
century castle. Upon receiving the news that two thirds of his estate, which had been preserved
in his family for over 500 years, was to be seized by the Nazi government, Count Güntzel Graf
von der Schulenberg, fought this appropriation of his land on the grounds of conservation. He
argued that his land should be spared because the 80 and 100 year old oak trees that covered the
grounds should be protected under the 1935 Reichsnaturschutzgetz (Reich’s Environmental
Protection Law) under article 1 paragraph 3 which deemed alte oder seltene Bäume (old or rare
trees) as a form of Naturdenkmal (Natural Monument). Despite this and other attempts by Count
von der Schulenberg, Robert Ley remained unconvinced of the conservationist argument and the
appropriation of the land near the castle grounds moved forward.306
Delivering on a people’s car was important, not only in raising the standards of living of
the German public, but it was also important for the “visual consumption” of Nazi ideology that
was the focus of developing the autobahn.307 When the project of building a national highway
system was announced, two ideas competed for how such an endeavor should be undertaken.
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One school of thought followed the example of railway lines and thus promoted straight
highways that could create the most logical network of transportation that would be more
affordable, safer, and cost efficient to build. This plan was rejected for the idea championed by
Fritz Todt. Todt saw the highways as a means to educate the public about the importance of the
nation. Equal parts engineer and Romantic landscape painter, Todt’s roads were built onto the
sides of mountains and through valleys, winding through woods and circling lakes. The hope
was that by traveling the highways Germans would experience the awe and majesty of nature
which would enforce a sense of community.308
Yet, in 1936 Todt and Hitler’s vision was facing a serious threat. Several thousand
kilometers of road were already constructed and many more thousands of kilometers of roads
were under construction and in the planning stages.309 If the principle reason for the roads was
meant to foster a sense of community, as the choice to go with Todt’s vision seems to indicate,
then the fact that only the wealthy middle class could use these roads undermined the entire
enterprise, making the highways another class divisive element. The complaint that national
highways would only be roads for the rich was a familiar argument in the 1920s when the roads
where first proposed before the Nazi seizure of power.310 If the value of the roads could be
harnessed, and if the German public was to be transformed sufficiently to engage with nature and
comprehend the importance of community, the missing element was a car that every German
could own.
For the Nazis, the main point of nature and conservation to the Nazi regime was to instill
a mystical sense of belonging to the racial nation. As long as nature remained isolated from the
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public, it served no educational function, hence the impetus for building a national highway
system. Yet, nature’s secrets and mysteries would still be obscured as long as these highways
remained empty, hence the drive for building the largest automobile factory in the world. It was
neither the case that conservation was unimportant in the grand scheme of things, nature was
highly important for conveying the non-materialist agenda of emphasizing Volksgemeinschaft.
Yet, it would be equally naive to suggest that the entire goal of creating the Volkswagen was to
help Germans escape the city and experience nature, the car was meant to live in town and
country. More accurately, one can say that the evidence presented here indicates that Nazi
conservation, construction of the autobahn, and Strength through Joy programs that subsidized
vacations, improved working conditions, raised the standard of living, and created consumer
products including the Volkswagen, were all put into the service of the concept of
Volksgemeinschaft, a racial community where the individuals would be willing to make the
necessary sacrifices to the common wheal.
On May 26th 1938, the Volkswagen Werk, conceived to be the world’s largest automotive
factory, laid its cornerstone with the usual fanfare which one expected from a Nazi project. 311
This day loomed large in the regime’s imagination, as it was the first tangible evidence that
indicated the long promised affordable car would become a reality. Hiott characterizes the event
as perfectly choreographed and rehearsed with the brick masons dressed in white coveralls and
top hats and the carpenters dressed in black velvet.312 Despite the size and complexity of the
factory its design and construction took less time than Porsche had spent developing a
functioning prototype of the car that would be built there.313 In an exercise of stoicism, many
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prominent members of the RDA were in attendance and mingling and glad-handing Porsche,
Ley, and Werlin despite their anxieties concerning their future. Reportedly, Werlin approached
Robert Allmers, chairman of the RDA, and made some disparaging comments about Allmer’s
choice to wear a light colored his funeral.314 Allmers had every reason to take Werlin’s threat
seriously. Nazi architect and one time head of the KdF program Beauty of Work, Albert Speer
said after the war that had Germany won, the KdF-Wagen would be the only car produced.315
The DAF was committed to seeing this project to fruition where the auto industry had
failed, and implemented a policy of dissolving every problem in liquid capital. But deep pockets
would not be enough; the factory had to appropriate American knowhow wherever it could. The
industrial workshop was modeled on Henry Ford’s River Rouge plant.316 The majority of the
tools and heavy machinery could not be built in Germany and were sourced from the United
States.317 As the cornerstone was being laid twenty German emigrants who had worked on
Ford’s assembly lines were training a new workforce in a facility in Braunschweig.318 By the
autumn of 1938, given Germany’s zero percent unemployment, the factory could only be
completed when Mussolini sent thousands of unemployed Italian workers. Hopfinger remarked
that the experience of these Italian construction workers foreshadowed the experience of the
forced laborers co-opted to produce wartime armaments on the shop floor. As early as 1938 the
Italian guest workers “lived in wooden huts surrounded by barbed wire and watchtowers.”319
Yet, despite this colossal effort, the factory would be immediately converted for war
production. The RDA’s stall tactics had worked and not a single car would be produced for
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private use as the goal of motorizing Germany was deferred until the close of a successful war.320
Once the factory was converted for rearmament in 1939 the inflexibility of the factory’s design
made it extremely inefficient for the task of building bombs.
D. The Linchpin to Nazi Modernity: The Volkswagen’s Meaning in the Third Reich
Moving the Volkswagen project under the umbrella of KdF also gave Ley a chance to rebrand the small car and re-conceptualize its role in German society. Ley’s office was
experienced in creating advertisement campaigns to sell vacation and tourism packages. This
know-how was imperative for updating the image of the Volkswagen which was still using
production and industrial imagery. The KdF advertising department was able to soften the harsh
lines and re-imagine the car as an instrument of leisure and a part of daily life. Using Porsche’s
prototypes, the ad men at KdF held a photo shoot for promotional material particularly aimed at
young couples. The first image shows a couple courting with the KdF-Wagen which gave them
the freedom to travel to the countryside to enjoy each other’s company. The second image
shows another young couple that traveled to the countryside for a camping trip by the lake. What
is most valuable in both images is not the material object which is incidental to the scene, rather
what is most important is the situation that the material object facilitated.
In the same series, there is a photo of a family of six (who knows how they all fit in the VW) on
vacation. Note that the Volksempfänger in the foreground was placed there to help illustrate the
interconnectedness of Nazi modernization policy. It is possible to image that these vacationers
bought a weekend excursion package through the KdF, traveled to their destination in their KdFWagen on Hitler’s Highways, and now are enjoying radio programming through the portable
Volksempfänger.
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E. Conclusion
Rieger and König’s works are exceptional in that they attempt to reveal what the car
meant for the Nazis and why creating a Volkswagen topped the Nazi’s priority list.321
Discussing Nazi modernizing policies, including the construction of the Autobahn and the
Volkswagen, has many potential pit falls. Some automotive historians have carefully bracketed
off this aspect in German historical works while others have avoided the topic all together. Hiott
insists that the entire motorization process under Hitler was aimed solely at military
expansionism and the creation of Lebensraum.322 Rieger discredits this position saying,
“attempts to render the motorcar accessible to the wider population possessed only tenuous
connections with the aggressive expansionist agenda.”323 Rieger, in the vein of Sachs and
Jeffery Herf, unflinchingly reconciles the Nazi modernization policy with their atavistic
characteristics: “The Nazis sought to create a highly technicized environment permeated by a
spirit of modernity in which unalterable racial characteristics of the German people would
flourish powerfully.”324
The ambitious goal of the Nazis was to end class conflict in the Volk by eliminating the
outward signs of superiority that one could achieve in a consumerist society. If everyone drove a
car to work, then it would be easier to treat everyone else as an equal, whether he or she worked
on the factory floor or on the board of directors. Somehow, this was the message that Hitler saw
in the success of Ford’s Model T. Yet in the changing contexts of the 1930s Hitler saw
America’s success as both an example and a threat. Many of the same central elements of
uniformity revealed in the prescribed solutions the Nazi regime handed down to the automotive
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industry are also found in social programs like the attempt to create a Volksgemeinschaft,
through their solution to labor, the Deutsche Arbeits Front (DAF), Hitler Jugende (Hitler Youth)
and as well as their most infamous policy of racial purity through genocide. Yet, the claim that
Nazism draws from a particular reading of Fordism is a much larger question with different
objectives and formative questions from the current understanding of the creation of the
Volkswagen. It would first have to disconnect from a capitalist philosophy in an anti-capitalist
society. As Mary Nolan points out, the idea of “rationalization,” such as Ford’s production
methods, was synonymous with Americanization in Weimar Germany.325
The failures of Nazi economic policy mirror the same patterns as their military and
evolving Jewish policy--they fought the economic war on too many fronts ensuring wartime
success and developing a consumer society while pursuing autarky overtaxed the available
resources. Instead of reconsidering the development of the Volkswagen in light of the
overwhelming evidence that the car would be a financial mistake, they doubled down on the
investment and prayed for a “miracle weapon” in the form of future gains in rationalization to
offset the cost of building each Volkswagen. Just as they would do with linking the problems of
disease and Jews in the Ghettos, they saw the problems that they created, a failing consumer
economy due to low wages, as evidence of what they already believed, with inadequate
Lebensraum Germany would continue to have a low standard of living compared to the United
States and the West.
Both the debates on rationalization and the desire to improve the quality of life through
consumption were in response to the rise of America. Tooze considers America’s rise the
principal insight for explaining the trajectory of the Nazi economy. He states plainly in his
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preface that “America should provide the pivot for our understanding of the Third Reich.”326
Roth suggests a strong link between the American production methods and the character of the
“total society” of the Third Reich, and questions the Americanization of Germany during the
Third Reich, the importance of the automotive industry, and the impact that it had on the worker.
327

Tooze helps not only answer Roth’s questions but in explaining Hitler’s American inspired

vision of a consumer culture, he elaborates on this development in order to give real insights into
the Nazi mentality. The failings of Volksprodukte, as evidenced in the Four Year Plan
Memorandum, could be laid at the feet of the usual enemies of the Reich. Tooze states: “Whilst
Germans were constrained to inhabit an inadequate Lebensraum hedged around by hostile
powers, egged on in their antagonism towards Germany by the global Jewish conspiracy, it was
no surprise that Germans could not afford cars.”328 Thus, the experiment with consumer culture
further proved the Nazi intuition: America’s star was on the rise in the 1920s because of its
vastness, its diverse natural resources, and its class solidarity achieved through common
consumption. Critically, for Germany to achieve the latter it would have to expand its own
borders and find a “final solution” to the Jewish problem.
As Germany’s fate became increasingly clear in the closing stages of the Second World
War, Hitler told Albert Speer: “If the war is lost, the nation will also perish. This fate is
inevitable. There’s no reason to take into consideration what the people will need to continue a
most primitive existence. On the contrary, it will be better to destroy these things ourselves
because the nation will have proven itself to be the weaker one.”329 As the SS guards abandoned
their posts at the Volkswagen factory, they acted against orders and left the factory standing.
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The forced foreign laborers, who were conscripted to produce armaments for the Wehrmacht,
were isolated, starved, and angry. In the first four days, riots swept through the factory city
destroying equipment and burning barracks.330
The American ground troops were in the area but, supplied with outdated maps, were
unaware of the existence of the factory.331 A few anxious volunteers, including a French friar
who spoke some English and a German priest, took a Red Cross Jeep into the nearby town of
Gifhorn to ask the American troops to restore order.332 When the Americans arrived at the
factory city, surveying the destruction, none would have wagered that they were looking at the
future home and headquarters of the world’s largest manufacturer of automobiles. The American
troops set up camp in the nearby castle of Wolfsburg, for which the Nazi’s Strength-ThroughJoy-Car-City was renamed.333
By the autumn of 1945, Wolfsburg was left to the British as part of their occupational
zone. Still facing chaos and disorder, the British put the civilians and the foreign laborers to
work cleaning up the factory city, and repairing the British jeeps. Over the coming months the
plant became a central workshop dedicated to servicing Allied military vehicles. Since the
British Occupation Forces faced a shortage of staff cars, and after taking stock of the available
supplies around Wolfsburg, the decision was made to have the civilian population start hand
producing the military version of the Volkswagen. Cobbled together from existing parts, they
were able to produce 713 vehicles by the end of 1945.334
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In January of 1948, the British appointed Heinrich Nordhoff as general manager for the
factory and in 1949 the British Occupation authorities signed trusteeship over to the local
government of Lower Saxony.335 When Nordhoff took the helm as the General Manager of the
Volkswagen factory, he realized that rebuilding would require new equipment which could only
come from abroad. Cars soon started rolling out of the factory, as Hopfinger notes, Nordhoff
“now found himself guiding a concern which, although it did not belong to anyone, employed
10,277 people and produced already in 1949 a total of 46,594 vehicles, of which 7,170 were
exported.”336 From the end of World War II, the impulse to export was a matter of necessity
rather than design. Moreover, as Hopfinger has shown, the lack of a hard currency in Germany
meant that, “if manufacturers required foreign currency to purchase raw material or essential
machinery, then he had to earn it with exports.” 337 Survival meant exportation. So, once
currency reform created Germany’s own hard currency, the Deutsch Mark, Volkswagen had
created networks in Europe, the Middle East, South America, and, above all, the United States.338
IV. Rebuilding and Reimagining the Volkswagen in the Post-War Federal Republic
As the many monographs on Volkswagen demonstrate, the post-war history of
Volkswagen has its own particular questions. First is the question of how the factory was able to
be transformed from a war torn building with much of its equipment rusting in the surrounding
forests to a major player in the automotive world in such a short amount of time. This question
functions at two levels. At the economic level, the now familiar story is one of bootstrapping.
Divorced from its ideological exclusivity, the car was able to flower in an environment of
335
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capitalism and competition. This helps explain how the car becomes a cultural symbol of the
Federal Republic which raises a second question: “how does a car so integral to the Third Reich
become a symbol for a country desperate to distance itself from the Nazis?” This second
question is usually addressed through the re-ascribing of the small car to Porsche.339
Rieger notes that appropriating the Volkswagen from the Nazis required selective
memory of the Nazis and the war which recast the German public as victims.340 While this is a
definite feature of the promotional material and public events that Volkswagen AG (the
company) generated in the immediate post-war years, the message circulated in the public did
not require such treatment. Starting in November of 1950, Der Spiegel published a series of five
articles giving a detailed timeline for the car and factory that firmly placed Volkswagen in the
Third Reich and chronicled its transformation. Confrontation with the Nazi past came to a boil
over the DAF Sparkarte program where subscribers paid into accounts for cars that were never
produced. Volkswagen AG always treated the complaints from subscribers as a burden, but in
reality it gave them a chance to make a clear statement about Volkswagen’s culpability and
obligations. Contesting the plaintiffs’ claims, Nordhoff is quoted in a 1954 article in Time as
stating, “They put their money and their trust in the 1,000 year Reich. Why should they profit
through this trust while others lost all they had?”341 Karl Stolz represented the plaintiffs in the
post-war civil suit, yet the article in Der Spiegel makes it clear that in this case “in the economic
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situation left behind by the war, good sense is on the side of a Volkswagen. The time has passed
on the DAF, on the KDF-saving…”342 The article surmises that
The Volkswagen campaign was in its entirety a highly political action. The
strength of the German people, from which the plant to be built is broken, the joy
that it intended to serve, extinguished. (in reference to the Strength through Joy
Program) Despite the full force of the DAF nothing more left; the organization is
forgotten, the accumulated in vast amounts of money has disappeared.343

This was an important idea within the company as well. Through hard work and
determination, Volkswagen AG succeeded where the Nazis failed. Heinz Nordhoff realized the
purifying quality of hard work and employed it in his ‘leadership by example’ style. In 1948 Der
Spiegel ran an article on Nordhoff’s management style stating, “In conversation with his staff
you realize how important the role of industrial bosses as an incentive for the other can be. ‘Dr.
Nordhoff works 17 hour days,’ it says in the anteroom.”344 Mostly, Nordhoff deflected this
attention back to the object for sale: the Volkswagen.345 Thus, the Volkswagen became a
peacetime symbol with much of the same symbolic content of Rosie the Riveter for the wartime
United States. Although the car would out sell all other models in the decade following the war,
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the car’s main affective appeal was based on this story of overcoming and hard work. This
production image would also provide a contrasting framework to the leisure image that was
cultivated under the DAF. It stood as an example of what Germans could do in their new
political and economic state.
A. International Ambassador and the Cosmopolitan Beetle
“Every German car that goes out abroad today is, at the same time an ambassador for
us,” claimed Dr. Schulz-Wittuhn in 1948.346 Wittuhn continued: "The German car is a concept
of quality and will always be in demand in countries with high traffic. But we have to deliver the
quality of what the world expects from us and not get into the habit [of] the horse trader."347
What Wittuhn recognized was that the automobile could give international validation for the new
Federal Republic. Wittuhn’s particular struggle was convincing the government of the value of
setting aside precious materials for car production that could otherwise be used in the rebuilding
of Germany.348 Wittuhn realized that the automobile could act as an international ambassador
that would not only provide the means for economic growth but would integrate Germany back
into the world. In an article covering the Spanish liberal philosopher and essayist José Ortega y
Gasset’s 1949 visit to Germany, the author stated that, “the first thing that interested the worldfamous Spaniards on German soil, was a Volkswagen.”349 Musing over the car, Der Spiegel
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quoted Ortega as saying, “I believe that Germany is resourceful, resilient and courageous [and
Germany] will come back in the future from the disaster.”350 Volkswagen’s new emphasis on
production over consumption, evidenced by the decision to forego extensive advertising
campaigns throughout the 1950s, slowly transformed into a program of consumption by way of
production.
Hopfinger emphasizes the economic need to export as a way to gain raw materials for
new production.351 While this economic concern is what motivated Nordoff and Volkswagen
AG to establish trade networks and sell the car abroad, it also gave another layer of meaning to
the small car that would contrast the Nazi plans for the people’s car. One of the earliest
Volkswagen advertisements in Germany from 1956 is titled “America says ‘Yes’ to the
Volkswagen.” This ad emphasized the respect that the small car commanded abroad.352
Succeeding in the American market was a particularly strong endorsement because of the deep
associations between the country and the car, and American’s long experience with the
automobile made them discerning connoisseurs. The advertisement reports that “American test
drivers report excitedly about the car’s sensible construction, its tasteful finish (paint work),
about its high build quality and precision, its robust air cooled engine and its torsion bar
suspension, which one can only find on rare expensive cars in America.”353 Turning from
production to American consumption of the Beetle, the ad notes how more than the economical
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price, the car attracts attention because of its practical nature, it is easy to park, but also because
in America, the car is “utterly ‘different.’”354
DDB incorporated this idea in one of their first ads in 1959 that appeared in Der Spiegel.
The headline for this particular ad was, “America’s highest car is not American.” The play on
words for this advertisement is that ad is actually talking about ground clearance, claiming the
small car sits higher than any American car.355 The ad transitions to talk about other spatial
features of the Volkswagen, suggesting that there is enough headroom that one can leave his or
her hat on while driving.356 The main departure from the 1956 advertisement that uses American
reception as a selling tool is how the advertisement emphasizes the cars German heritage; the ad
claims that the car, “has become as American as sauerkraut with frankfurters.”357
When describing the globalizing forces at play after 1945, Rieger denies the one-sided
view that sees globalization simply as the Americanization of the world. Instead he claims that
“a wider internationalization characterized world culture after 1945. Few commodities illustrate
this trend better than a German automobile that gained international fame, not least in the United
States itself.”358 The charge of Americanization must also be understood differently from 1945
onward than it had been used historically in Germany. Americanization from the 1880s forward
described a completely self-imposed appropriation of certain aspects of modern life, such as
consumerism. In the post-war period, American authorities attempted to actively impose the
values associated with America on German citizenry at many levels of society. Layered on top
of that is the complexity of the Wirtschaftswunder, or economic miracle, and its relationship to
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the Marshal Plan and the European Recovery Program which, as Jarausch points out, “placed
Germany’s revival within a larger framework while also offering short term loans to help the
economy get off the ground.”359 While Volkswagen could claim that it never took any of the
Marshal Plan money, as the company liked to tell American reporters, it is a bit simplistic to
conclude that Volkswagen did not benefit from the stability and economic recovery that was
partly due to such stimulus money.360
In the context of the cold war, the U.S. was eager to claim West Germany’s success as
the result of American intervention and project claims of their superiority over the communist
endeavors in East Germany. In its clearest form, this is illustrated in a cover article by the Times
from February 15, 1954 titled “Comeback in the West,” which sets Volkswagen’s success, and
by extension, West Germany’s success, in relation to America. The article argues that,
“Germany’s rebirth is the kind of economic miracle Americans can understand. At a time when
other European nations were leaning towards socialism, Germany plumped for free
enterprise.”361 The article attributes this success to Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, whose
hand produced for the “free world…its strongest European bulwark against Communism.”362
The article demonstrates a naiveté about the actual economic model the Federal Republic
implemented known as the ‘social market’ economy, which combined a free market approach
with social responsibility. The article cites Erhard as saying, “Turn the people and the money
loose, and they will make the country strong.”363 This is an oversimplification of Erhard’s actual
policy as he explains elsewhere that, “This freedom does not mean license, and it does not mean
359
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irresponsibility, but rather it means steady, obligatory devotion to the common weal.”364 The
article’s attempt to cast West Germany as a ‘little America’ then turns towards Volkswagen’s
success. The article tries to lay claim to Volkswagen’s key figure Heinrich Nordhoff by linking
him to American business and connecting his experiences in America to the success of
Volkswagen. General Motors briefly owned the German car company, Opel, in the 1930s where
Nordhoff worked writing service manuals.365 “Because of his years of American training in
G.M. Opel, Nordhoff did not wear the pompous, punctilious air of German industry’s traditional
Herr Generaldirektor.”366 The article continues by describing Nordhoff as, “an engineersalesman who combines the drive (and fluent English) of an American, with the perseverance of
a German.”367
B. Selling the Beetle to America
On the corner of 59th and Park Avenue on July 16th 1950, the Beetle had its American
début on the Hoffman Motor Car showroom floor.368 The potential Beetle customer would have
to walk past luxurious imports such as Jaguar Mark Vs, XK 120s, and Citroën Traction Avant
before his or her eye settled on the humble offerings from the newly renamed factory-city of
Wolfsburg, Germany.369 Even among these well-known foreign imports, the Volkswagen would
have seemed foreign. Author Paul Ingrassia retells a joke from that time where, “A donkey says
to a Volkswagen, ‘Hey, what are you?’ ‘I’m a car,’ the Volkswagen replied. ‘What are you?’ ‘In
that case,’ said the donkey, ‘I’m a horse.’”370 It was not just that the Beetle did not fit in on the
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Hoffman Motor Car showroom floor. It was an aberration out of sync with American car
culture.
Yet, the context of the new rivalry of ideology and a recovering Germany muted the
distinctions between American norms of car production and consumption and the new program
that Nordhoff pursued at Volkswagen. In the 1950s auto manufacturers in the United States
initially dismissed the Volkswagen as a novelty. As Hiott reports, “By the mid-1950s, while
most adult Americans still identified the car with Hitler and the war… the American market was
generally not very open to foreign cars.”371 Thus, it was no surprise that the French
manufacturer, Renault, rather than Volkswagen had made the biggest inroads into the American
market in the 1950s. But Renault’s success was fleeting, partially because the company exported
the car without creating the necessary infrastructure with networks of dealerships, service
centers, and parts suppliers in the United States. Nordhoff himself recognized the differences
between the European and the American car when he told Der Spiegel in 1948 that, “The
American automobile industry has become increasingly further and foreign to us. With pale envy
and unreserved admiration we see…these "living room on wheels"372 There is no consensus as to
why the Beetle was such a commercial success abroad. Flink believes that it is partly due to the
fact that the Beetle proved itself in motor sport by facing tough terrain, endurance trails, and a
corporate philosophy that put “service before sales.”373 Ingrassia maintains that the Beetle spoke
to Americans in a language they could understand by costing nearly half the price of the low end
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domestics.374 Volkswagen’s focus in the first four years after forming a company in 1948 was
using the foreign markets to shore up rebuilding the factory, but it also was an experiment to see
if the Volkswagen had universal appeal.
Corporate policy towards reinvesting shifted its focus from machinery to marketing in the
mid 1950s. Volkswagen had to forge an identity as a company, and their single product, the
Beetle, had to be the focal point for that identity. The Volkswagen Beetle was the culmination of
a distinctly German car culture which viewed things differently. Through marketing campaigns,
both in the United States and in Europe, the company crafted divergent images. In the United
States, Volkswagen’s marketing was entrusted to the Madison Avenue agency Doyle, Dane, and
Bernbach (DDB).375 Following the Beetle’s example of breaking American car culture’s norms,
the agency also broke the norms of American advertising. They defied convention through “selfdeprecating humor,” revealed in early tag lines such as “Ugly is only skin-deep.”376 Gaining
momentum, DDB’s approach reached its zenith in their most famous VW print ad which
pictured a Beetle with a subscript that simply said “Lemon.”377 These ads became a cultural
phenomenon in and of themselves.378 But DDB’s American interpretation of the car, as
conveyed in their advertisements, ultimately only speaks to the meaning of the Beetle for
Americans, where the Beetle merged with concepts of unconventionality in the public mind and
became a symbol of its owner. The specific meaning of the Beetle is given by the consumer
culture in which it inhabits. For Volkswagen advertising in America, this message does not
necessarily reflect the native mass cultural meaning. The cycle of advertising, interpretation by
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the public, consumption, then reinterpretation by the corporation, engenders a specific cultural
meaning onto consumer products. In international discourse the gulf between native and ferried
messages becomes most apparent in how the two advertising campaigns reacted to the Beetle’s
form. Yet, as Rob Kroes warns, “it is one thing to explore the programmatic strategies of the
organizers and producers of such forms of mass culture; it is a totally different thing actually to
gauge what the audience chooses to get out of them.”379 Even when an advertisement goes
“viral” it is difficult to divine which aspects of the advertisement elicits a response in the public.
This is only exacerbated when placed into an international context.
In observing the major trends in print advertisement of the Volkswagen Beetle from
1950-68, two styles of presentation were employed: ideological and practical representation.
The first type, ideological advertisement, utilized a single graphic element, a black and white
photograph of the car. These are the most iconic images of the Beetle, which strictly followed
self-created principles for over a decade. It made Beetle ads unique and instantly recognizable.
This minimalist approach echoes the central ethos of the car’s design of exalting simplicity and
functionality over flashiness and ostentation. Devoid of setting and/or characters, the reader
must provide the context. The total effect is that the car appears idealized, as though it exists
outside of space and time. The photograph’s composition varied wildly to achieve distinct
consequence. There are no special effects, the lighting is uniform, and the image is in sharp
focus. The use of negative space created additional layers of meaning where the white, square
frame is contrasted by the roundness of a typically black car, which accentuates the flowing lines
of the body. Sometimes this is achieved in such a way that the car seems to be a round peg in a
square hole. The perspective of the photographs may be low or high but is rarely at eye level.
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Rarely will the Beetle take up the entire print. Instead it is positioned in the bottom third of the
frame which pulls the eye downwards to the text. Again, the empty space is most often large
enough to constitute its own visual element. The advertisers realized that the best way to stand
out in visually chaotic magazines was to use blank space. The care and detail which these prints
require modestly transform the so called ‘ugly car’ into a thing of beauty. The remarkable thing
about the advertisements was, just like the car, they were marked by absence. The lack of
motivational visual aids, such as young women or hyper masculine men, common to
advertisements of the time, de-sexualized the image of the car. In this way, the advertising
transcended demographics and target markets, resulting in a car which, theoretically, had
universal appeal. These advertisements also made use of text as a compositional tool, which
enforced and enhanced the striking photographs.
The textual elements of the advertising also follow strict principles. Short, clever taglines
appear in a large, bold font. Then three columns of fine print text, located below, explain the
tagline. The fine print is so disproportionally small that the reader has to physically move in
closer in order to read it. Smaller still is the price which sits directly below the photograph, and
at a glance looks more like an artist’s signature than consumer information. Compared to other
car advertisements, the Volkswagen ads are extremely text- heavy containing fifteen to twenty
full sentences. In short, they are completely unique. What DDB accomplished was to take a car
designed in the mid 1930’s, and make it look more modern than any other car available in
Europe or America.380
Despite this, DDB enjoyed marketing the car as ugly, it became a motif featured in
campaigns as late as 1969, long after the Beetle became integrated into the American automotive
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landscape.381 But in Germany, the Beetle was the automotive landscape. By 1963, Volkswagen
had sold over three million Beetles to the German public.382 Moreover, the German small-car
market included offerings from BMW, Opel, Skoda, and imports like Fiat and Citroën which
echoed the Beetle’s design and simplistic character, and sold at similar costs. In Germany, the
Beetle’s shape was a quality to be praised rather than regretted. A 1962 German advertisement
featured an upright egg with a drawing in marker of the back of the Beetle. The large print
declared: “there are shapes which cannot be improved.”383 Unapologetically, the fine print
recounts the functional superiority of the round shape, that it is aerodynamic, streamlined, and
timeless, all of which rationalizes the body shape which “embodies an idea.” 384
In an interview with Der Spiegel in 1948, Nordhoff stated that Volkswagen was in a
unique position in that they were the only ones poised to make a small affordable car without
compromising quality.385 In his estimation, there was no need to look for redesigns or evolving a
second model as long as they had supremacy in this market.386 Yet the practical and the
symbolic became intertwined in the continuity of the Volkswagen. This was the most common
theme in the German Volkswagen advertising. The fact that the Beetle kept its shape in a world
obsessed with change would be featured as a selling point in advertisements throughout the
1950-60s as proof of its strengths. “Volkswagen’s Theory of Evolution,” an ad printed in Der
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Spiegel in 1963, presented fifteen identical Beetles in profile view labeled with its individual
year model underneath each car. Playing on the Darwinian evolution of man drawings, the cars
lined up sequentially stretching from 1949-63.387 This advertisement was presented in both the
United States and Germany. Ingrassia sees this advertisement as DDB’s continued attack on the
“keeping up with the Joneses” mentality, which drove consumer culture.388 However, on closer
inspection, this message is muddled by the last line in both the American and the German ad:
‘the most evolved VW is the ‘63 model.’389 The emphasis on keeping a new, more evolved
model of the Beetle may in fact show that the Beetle was not entirely as “anti-materialistic” as
Ingrassia leads the reader to believe.
This is the point where the message of stability and continuity comes into conflict with a
consumerist notion of progress. These issues would be reconciled in an advertisement from
1965. In this advertisement, the original model of the Beetle is pictured angled away from the
viewer. The headline reads, “Many thought as early as 1948 that we should change him.”390 The
small print outlines the “approximate 2,108 changes” which have taken place over the 17 years,
concluding, “when it is necessary to change everything, we will change everything.” 391
Designers and advertisers would often draw upon invisible changes, such as engine size.
Focusing on the inner changes, while maintaining its outward appearance, divides the
expectations of the American and German automobile. By focusing on the inner changes, the
effect was not to change appearance but the experience of driving.
V. Conclusion
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The symbolic content of the automobile is difficult to divorce from the symbolic and
mythical America. Often the creation of this association is placed at the feet of Henry Ford who
first introduced rationalized and mechanized production processes to the automobile. This
venture made the Ford Model T available to the average man and created the first motorized
nation in the world. However, Ford cannot take all of the credit for this association between
America and the automobile. Five years before Ford started production, Julius Otto Bierbaum
published a book and titled it Yankeedoodlefahrt und andere Reisegeschichten (Yankee Doodle
Trip and other Travel Stories) thus giving an American face to the method of car travel.392 But
what conjured America in Bierbaum’s mind when riding through Germany? After all, he was in
a machine that had been invented in Germany at a time when there was no remarkable difference
between production and consumption of the automobile in Europe and the United States.393
Yankeedoodlefahrt was in many ways a sequel to his popular book from 1903, Eine empfindsame
Reise im Automobile. Von Berlin nach Sorrent und zurück an den Rhein (A sentimental journey
by automobile: From Berlin to Sorrento and back to the Rhine), the first German book to feature
an automotive journey.394 In this book, Bierbaum writes, “The meaning of the automobile is
freedom, self-possession, self-discipline, and ease,” all of which were adjectives for the
emerging American lifestyle.395 This would be echoed a half century later by Jürgen Habermas
in a newspaper article, “Autofahren: der Mensch am Lenkrad”(Traveling by Car: Man behind the
Wheel). A Habermas was most interested in utilizing the phenomenon of driving as a series of
metaphors for modern life. Perhaps this is why Habermas sees many of the same elements that
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Bierbaum described, concluding that driving is democratic, requires self-discipline, and even that
there is a Marxian ‘alienation’ of the driver.396
And yet, Daniel Miller fundamentally changed the way the automobile is studied with a
single sentence when he claimed that within the available literature, “there is no sense that the
car might be a different cultural form or experience among different groups.”397 This revelation
began the overturning of the normative practice of using American car culture as a measuring
stick or even a surrogate for other national experiences with the automobile. Historians Rudy
Koshar, Lewis Siegelbaum, and Cotton Seiler have all participated in dislodging America as the
only cultural home to the automobile. While many recent works on the automobile have taken
Daniel Miller’s challenge to heart, attempting to rethink and reconstruct the cultural significance
of the automobile in, among other places, Germany and the United States, no one has taken the
next step by tracing the cultural interaction among nations concerning the automobile.
While many cars have the potential to demonstrate this interchange, none showcase this
better than the Volkswagen Beetle. First, the small car is widely recognized as a cultural symbol
in both the United States and Germany. In Germany, the Beetle symbolized the growing
respectability of the Wirtschaftswunderzei (Economic Miracle Era), and in the United States the
car was appropriated by the counter-culture of the 1960s. The Volkswagen project’s
longstanding ambition was to bridge the gap between German automotive tradition and mass
consumption; it is therefore a ‘German’ response to an ‘American’ phenomenon. Thus, mythical
America was instrumental in the creation of the Beetle. Volkswagen’s post war success ushered
in a new chapter in German car culture and automobility, which not only made Volkswagen a
396
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success but also breathed new life into all German automotive concerns. Hence, there exists a
dialogue between Germany and the United States, each telling the other what they read from
their partner’s car culture. American and German car cultures rely on interpretation from outside
of their own national-cultural frameworks for the creation of their own car culture which was
managed through international trade.
Demonstrating this interplay problematizes the Americanization narrative of Germany
during the post-war era by showing how German post-war car culture was a product of their own
developments rather than an imposition or an appropriation of American car culture. Certainly
the image of America played a role in this formation, but two central points can be made to
assuage claims of Americanization in post-war Germany. First, Germany, at times consciously
and sometimes inadvertently, created its car culture on a different set of values, aesthetics, and
with different objectives than car culture in the United States. Thus, the two countries developed
discernibly divergent car cultures. Second, the process of grappling with perceived ‘American’
ideas, most notably the rationalized production lines and consumer driven society, has a long
history in Germany. Suggesting that these developments appear all at once in the post-war
period not only neglects this long history, but also presupposes that American ideals supplant
German ideals in an extraordinary framework outside of the essential cultural changes that all
societies undergo. Depending on who is commenting on these cultural changes, the ‘American’
qualities are often imbued with malevolent or magnanimous agency. Indeed, as Christoph
Hendrik Müller summarizes in his work on Americanization, invoking America often justified
pessimistic views of modernity in an attempt to make modern life seem foreign.398 Thus, the
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image of America was a device used in the debates and responses to cultural change in Germany;
however, historical analysis must not mistake this binary cultural identification for the actual
processes underway in Germany. In short, the shifting imagology of America that Germans
employed in constructing their own meanings for modernity and, in this case, the automobile
should not be conflated with a process of Americanization. Mary Nolan brings us closer to
understanding this relationship through the analogy of American fascination with Japan in the
1970s and 1980s. Nolan believes this interest in a rising global power mirrors the German
fascination with America in Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany. Applying the Japanese
metaphor to this issue of cultural change, it is useful to note how America interpreted Japanese
messages and changed its culture; however, it would be difficult to argue that America
underwent Japanization during that time.
Yet, if Americanization failed to encapsulate the cultural transformation experienced in
Germany, any alternative theory concerning cultural exchange must first investigate the limits
and possibilities of national forms of production and consumption. Since the automobile can be
approached from many different sources and methodologies, this work has attempted to access a
variety of historiographies and thereby connect conversations which have previously stood in
isolation. Extending and evaluating these theories to Volkswagen not only provides answers
pertaining to car culture, but also points to the amorphous behavior of culture as a whole. The
central question regards the role of material culture and the world of everyday life in the creation
of the national identities through the experience of production and consumption.
Following Wolfgang Sach’s lead, I posit that the car itself is one of the best indicators of
norms and values. However, evaluating car design for this purpose has many potential downfalls
as it is suspect to criticism concerning the car’s subjective content verses its objective function.
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One of the main areas overlooked in the history of Volkswagen has been in taking these
aggregate cultural representations in marketing and public reception in order to illuminate the
car’s national dimension. As Koshar explains,
Scholarship on the United States’ cultural impact on Europe–and on European
responses to ‘Americanization’–is perhaps one of the most promising areas of
research on the national dimensions of consumption… Such research remains
rather scattered and unfocused for historians… and some of it takes the national
dimension for granted.399
Yet, it would not be beneficial to reconstruct a national car culture which is either too universal
to function as a national descriptor or too narrow to encompass the majority’s experience of the
automobile within a country. This can be summarized by the question: what is German about
German car culture?
As the shifting historiography relating to the concept of the nation, national identity,
national traditions, and meanings evidences, one cannot assume that the nation provides the best
framework for evaluating cultural experience. This is particularly true with a modern cultural
artifact such as the automobile, which struggles to place itself into a national tradition, invented
or otherwise. Michael Billig and Tim Edensor are able to provide a way to posit positive
parameters for discussing national cultures.400 Billig argues that “the whole complex of beliefs,
assumptions, habits, representations and practices” which “(re)produce national identity are
reproduced in the banal realm of the everyday as part of the ‘endemic condition’ of nations.”401
Edensor gives this observation a central role in his thesis by arguing that “the national is
constituted and reproduced, contested and reaffirmed in everyday life,” which helps construct
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national “unreflexive identifications.”402 This emphasis allows Edensor to exchange the role of
culture and nation, where the nation had once been charged with the creation of culture, Edensor
maintains that it is largely culture which provides the cohesive elements to the nation. National
cultural patterns thereby become a common sense phenomenon by virtue of their “unreflexivity”
in practice and experience.
The current literature has been working away from these ideas as Rieger, Hiott, and
Patton all utilize the same sets of advertising to make claims concerning the reception of the
Beetle in Germany and the United States in a search for the “universal meaning of the universal
car.”403 One potential problem with Volkswagen’s advertising campaign was that it was
conducted by a third party advertising corporation, in this case the American agency Doyle Dane
and Bernbach. This problem can be dealt with more indirectly because authorship is less
important to the larger argument concerning the development of a public image because the
finalized advertisement is necessarily a consensus among the advisor, company, and publisher.
Ultimately, as Micheal Schudson argues in Advertising the Uneasy Persuasion: Its Dubious
Impact on American Society, this framework is advertisements’ main source of power and
influence over society. This implies that advertisements are subject to and reflective of larger
cultural currents rather than being manufactured from the outside of culture.
The advertisements provide the generalized image of German car culture and through
changes in marketing and responses in re-design by the car manufactures, these messages create
the outline of a car culture. For example, in the early days of advertising, Volkswagen sought
approval by using American sales as an example of the car’s worthiness for the German public.
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The automobile itself is a powerful primary source. Wolfgang Sachs acknowledged this when he
wrote:
Automobiles are a means of communication. Their material characteristics as
such do not stimulate demand, so much as the messages that they encapsulate.
They are like a language that allows one to enter into relations with oneself and
other. They communicate outwardly the owner’s self-conception and sense of
place in society, and in an internal dialogue they reveal themselves as a source of
gloating self-confirmation.404
Once the study demonstrates that the Volkswagen represented German car culture and presented
a unique alternative to American car culture, tracing the changes in American automobility at a
basic level is surprisingly simple. Ford and GM both introduced cars in the late 1950s and early
1960s which attempted to directly mirror the Volkswagen. The Chevrolet Corvair is perhaps the
clearest example of this as it was small, competitively priced, and even featured a rear engine
design. However, the most dramatic transformation would come from the Japanese invasion and
displacement of American domestic dominance of the 1970s and 1980s. The Volkswagen Beetle
was not only a powerful precedent for the Japanese “invasion,” it also provided a model for
design and distribution.405
Until very recently, cultural aspects have not been the historical focus on Volkswagen.
The process of distancing the Beetle from the Nazis began to take shape at the close of the war,
but was cemented in historical works such as K.B. Hopfinger’s 1971 monograph, The
Volkswagen Story. While Hopfinger does not ignore Hitler’s role in the creation of a “people’s
car,” by focusing on the design and development of the Beetle, he casts Dr. Porsche as his main
character to the detriment of the larger structural and cultural explanations absent in his text.
This pattern is then perpetuated in much of the literature concerning Volkswagen. In Birth of

404
405

Sachs, Love of the Automobile, 146.
Flink, The Automobile Age, 423.
124

the Beetle: The Development of the Volkswagen by Porsche, Chris Barber openly states that his
book’s raison d’être is to remind the world that Porsche was responsible for the world’s most
popular car.406
Most technological items do not carry the same emotional appeals that cars do. Cars
offer a version of freedom and self-expression that no other mere machines allow. As
individualistic as the car is, it also operates in the social environment. As these social
environments change, so too do the meanings around them. In post-war Germany, Volkswagen
had to find its own authentic voice, based on a car culture which began with Carl Benz. Rather
than being a rejection of American car culture, the Beetle was a part of the continuities of
Germany’s particular car culture which drew from a lineage of German ideas about modernity.
Since the Beetle never underwent any major redesigns in all the years it was produced, retaining
its shape could signify the Volkswagen’s rejection of the American car construct, and it may
further reveal the limitations of the concept of Americanization. Germany looked to America for
insights concerning modernity, but in their selective interpretation they created their own
meanings for the automobile. These attitudes followed Volkswagen’s lines of distribution
abroad and in the United States where the Volkswagen provided an alternative vision of what the
car could be.
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